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PUBLIC AFFAIRS TELEVISION AND THIRD PARTY ROLES: THE NIGHTLINE
DEBATES IN SOUTH AFRICA (1985) AND ISRAEL (1988)

Johannes (Jannie) Botes
Abstract
This paper examines the strategies, tactics and tasks of a media moderator during television
debates regarding deep-rooted conflicts, as well as the overall intended and unintended roles
and effects of these broadcasts. Two case studies—the Nightline (ABC-TV) broadcasts from
South Africa (1985) and Israel (1988)—are examined by comparing the actions of a public
affairs television moderator to conventional third party intervenors, as defined in conflict
resolution literature. In the process the paper presents research regarding the manifest tactics
and latent roles demonstrated by a television moderator and the manner in which these activities
can be compared to the tasks of conventional third parties such as mediators. The paper finally
also reflects on how television debates can become problem-solving dialogues that assist in
transforming deep-rooted conflicts.
Introduction
Despite all the support for the proposition that the news media do not and
cannot operate as effective third parties, I would argue that they can and do
(Arno, 1984, p. 233).
This article will focus specifically on television public affairs news programming: news
anchors and moderators who, similar to conventional mediators, purposefully bring parties in
conflict together, either physically in a television studio, or ‘unite’ them electronically for
discussion and debate. The research1is based on the ABC-TV program, Nightline, which
brought conflicting parties within Israel and South Africa together on television for the first time,
in South Africa in 1985 and in Israel in 1988. Nightline's regular interviewing format as well as
the program's larger ‘town meeting’ design for discussion, which includes audiences, formed the
basis of a comparative case analysis comparing the roles, actions, and interventions of television
anchors and producers, to that of the roles and functions of conflict intervenors as described in
conflict resolution literature. The notion that media forums do more than just establish contact
between opposing parties, but that they apparently have a third-party role in creating conditions
for the resolution of conflict, raises the question of how and where to test such a hypothesis.
Arno (1984) proposes a form of media analysis that is parallel to methods of analysis in thirdparty intervention. This, of course, inherently assumes a comparison between media and
conventional third party intervention roles that is at the heart of this paper.
Media Roles in Conflict and Conflict Resolution
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Is one of the roles of the news media, and especially of television, to become public
forums where disputants of all kinds can discuss or “negotiate” their differences? Both Loshitzky
(1991) and O'Heffernan (1991) have identified "on-air negotiations" on public affairs television
formats such as Nightline, as a role for the media. Loshitzky notes that television, and especially
the town meeting format "serves as an implicit, yet reflexive comment about the presumably
superior skills of television over reality to solve conflicts and to engage adversaries in a
productive process of negotiation" (1991, p. 564).
In general, however, there is lack of consensus about what exactly media roles are or
ought to be, let alone how they pertain to social conflict and its resolution in particular. This
problem has led media theorists such as Merrill (1990) to exclaim that nobody, not even
journalists, seem to know what media roles are supposed to be (see also Katz, 1989). In spite of
this there is a recurring theme in the discussion about media roles: the choice between neutral
and observer roles versus active and participant roles (McQuail, 1990). To define themselves as
simply being observers, chroniclers, and interpreters of events (Lichter and Noyes, 1996), is still
media-role-doctrine in most journalistic circles. The idea that journalists are simply neutral
channels of information has, however, been challenged by the notion of journalists as active
participants in nearly all forms of social interaction (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). Furthermore,
this activist perspective on a problem-solving role for the media in society brings us to the
media's potential as platforms for negotiation, mediation and conciliation.
In her seminal study of news media roles, Douglas (1992) notes that media roles rarely
indicate passivity, such as simply being interested bystanders or simply conduits of information.
Her delineation of media roles define mostly active media roles, such as:
[being] party to the conflict, advocate, legitimator, mediator, arbitrator, agent,
truth-seeker, agenda-setter, revolutionary, watchdog and guard dog. Some imply
bias or interest in a particular direction—namely party to the conflict, advocate,
legitimator, agent, agenda-setter, revolutionary, watchdog and guard dog. Others
indicate some version of neutrality–for instance, interested bystander, mediator,
arbitrator, truth-seeker (1992, p. 267).
More importantly, at least two of these roles—that of the media becoming mediators or
arbitrators—implies that the media provide (or become) forums for the opposing parties to
explain or discuss their positions. This, in turn, indicates how just about every form of
journalism, but especially radio and television debates, become forums where some or other
form of negotiation occurs. Wolfsfeld (1997) echoes this idea by suggesting that the news media
have become the central arena in which major conflicts are played out. This notion presupposes
some kind of competition for a space in the media forum (or arena) and a competitive debate via
the news media over contradicting positions.
This phenomenon is visible in the way that parties in conflict or opponents on a range of
societal matters, are increasingly using public affairs media platforms to “air” their differences,
and in a sense to directly and publicly negotiate with each other. Having established such a form
of communication, media moderators such as Nightline’s Ted Koppel has, by putting the parties
in direct contact, provided them with a form of, what Burton (1969, p. 61) terms, "controlled
communication." Moreover, Kelman’s description of the complementary role that interactive
problem solving can play during all stages of a negotiation process, also fits the role that public
affairs programs such as Nightline can play, albeit in a public, and not a behind-the-scenes
manner: “In the prenegotiation phase, they can help create a political atmosphere conducive to
movement to the table; in the active negotiation phase, …and in the postnegotiation phase, they
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can contribute to implementation of the negotiated agreement and to long-term peacebuilding
(Kelman, 1996, p. 502). Like problem solving workshops, and other forms of interactive conflict
resolution (see Fisher, 1997; Rothman, 1997), it is the non-binding nature of media debates that
allow for their potential unique contribution to the larger negotiation process. Unlike most
interactive conflict resolution models, however, media debates are public, and therefore, the
participants always run the risk of seeing the conflict becoming more polarized due to highly
adversarial statements made not only in public, but also to a large viewing audience.
Public affairs programs with debate formats, such as Nightline, provide an appropriate
example of unofficial media intervention in inter-group conflict, and to an extent even a form of
mediation between the groups in conflict. The source of this phenomenon, as Merrill (1989, pp.
10-11) contends, is the basic journalistic process of reporting on both sides of an issue, or
interviewing both sides of a conflict, together or apart, that results in "a reconciliation, a
hybridization, a mediation--a dialectical synthesis…"
As such, our understanding of the media, and especially television’s role as a forum for
negotiation has evolved over the past 25 years. In 1974, Davison gave this description of the
mass media's roles in international conflict resolution:
The media could increase the quantity and quality of the information that leaders and
publics in each nation have about other nations; they could provide early warning of
dangerous situations and could point out opportunities for strengthening international
understanding; they could encourage the use of negotiation, mediation, and other
mechanisms for conflict resolution, and facilitate the work of negotiators and
mediators; they could help to bring about states of mind in which peaceful solutions
would be more readily sought and accepted; and they could play a part in the
mobilization and encouragement of individuals and organizations seeking to
strengthen international understanding (pp. 6-7).
According to this demarcation, the media are merely responsible for drawing attention to
the role of negotiators and mediators, and not so much being third parties themselves or for
directly contributing to the resolution of conflict by providing a public forum. Other than
stimulating the use of mechanisms for conflict resolution, such as negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration, the major task this pioneer of the role of the mass media in conflict resolution
attributed to journalists was to "mobilize, or help establish contacts among those who are
interested in finding peaceful solutions, and to help build public opinion favoring such solutions"
(p. 26). Today, however, there is clearly a larger recognition that the media, and maybe
especially electronic media such as radio and television, often provide public spaces where
parties in conflict participate in a form of negotiation that may or may not contribute to a
resolution of their differences.
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Background to the Research
This research followed Arno's (1984) suggestion that there is a need for a form of media
analysis that is parallel to methods of analysis in third-party intervention. It attempted to
operationalize Arno's basic assumption that the most satisfactory answers concerning the media's
role in conflict resolution will probably be found through exploring the nature of the news
media's third-party intervention role.
Television public affairs programs such as Nightline, have in the past been highly
effective at bringing parties in conflict together, at times being even more successful than formal
national or international third parties or intervenors in this endeavor. Nightline has therefore
become particularly significant as research material to examine media third-party roles in
conflict resolution. As a television innovation, its public affairs format has become an
acceptable forum for national and international parties in conflict to face each other, while
anchorman Ted Koppel performs a role seemingly comparable to that of the ‘neutral’ third-party
facilitator or mediator. The program, therefore offers social scientists a laboratory for research
on ‘media diplomacy’, ‘media mediation,’ media tasks and roles, and even intervention ethics.
In comparing and contrasting the media's third-party intervention with more conventional third
parties (Botes, 1997), the main questions for research in this area became:
1) To what extent do television public affairs moderators perform third-party
roles in bringing conflicting parties together on television?
2) How do television third-party roles differ from those of conventional thirdparty intervenors?
To start addressing these primary research questions, data were gathered mainly through
a content analysis of Nightline broadcasts2 from South Africa and Israel, in 1985 (from March
18-22) and 1988 (from April 25-29), respectively. The programs aired nightly in the U.S. for
approximately one week each. (Edited versions of these broadcasts appeared a day or two later in
South Africa, and, in part, more than a week later in Israel.) This provided 10 broadcasts in total
from Israel and South Africa. Two different formats were used in Israel: the anchor interviewing
the opposing parties in person or by satellite, and the more elaborate town meeting format which
involved numerous disputants on either side of a conflict, as well as an audience of supporters
for both sides. In South Africa only the interview format was utilized—Koppel with one or both
of the opposing sides.
There are various reasons why Nightline became an obvious and appropriate choice for
this research. Ted Koppel’s widely acclaimed interviewing skills, as well as Nightline’s
reputation as the most innovative of public affairs television programs, provided the justification
for using these series of programs for research on aspects of the relationship between conflict
and the media. There are also obvious comparisons to be made between the two cases. The two
series of programs were both initiated during heightened periods of conflict. In 1985, South
Africa experienced civil unrest following the formation of the tri-cameral parliament that
excluded blacks from political power. Similarly, in December 1987, the Israeli-occupied
territories of Gaza and the West Bank orchestrated the “intifada,” a stone-throwing uprising of
the Palestinian youth, has also been noted before. In preparing for the Nightlines from Israel
“Koppel and Kaplan realized they had found ‘South Africa II' ”(Koppel and Gibson 1996: 98).
Because they contained similar (but also ways also different) interview settings, the two program
series form a unit on the one hand, and on the other, provide a cross-case analysis.
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During the broadcasts from South Africa in 1985 the African National Congress (ANC )
as the out-party, or out of power party (see Laue 1987), was mainly represented by Bishop
Desmond Tutu as the unofficial spokesperson for black South Africans in the absence of the then
still jailed Nelson Mandela. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), as the out-party
during the town hall broadcasts from Israel in 1988, was represented by a number of prominent
Palestinians with the blessing of PLO leader Yasser Arafat. They were Hanan Ashrawi, a
university professor and spokesperson for the Palestinian people and leadership in the Occupied
Territories (Ashrawi, 1995), Saeb Erakat, a then journalist and university professor, and Haider
Abdul Shafi, a physician and founding father of the PLO (Koppel and Gibson ,1996). A fourth
Palestinian panelist, the physician Mamdou al-Akhar, withdrew, seemingly because he deemed
the political risks in participating too high.
The in-parties were essentially the governments in each case, the Likud government in
Israel under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the white government of South Africa led by
President P.W. Botha. However, the town hall programs in Israel featured a range of political
perspectives in Israel: the Labor party member of the Knesset, Haim Ramon; Ehud Olmert, and
Eliahu Ben-Elissar, senior members of the Likud party; and Dedi Zucker, a Knesset member for
Citizens Rights who was also a founding member of the Peace Now movement. Because the
program format in the South Africa broadcasts did not include a town hall meeting, the main
feature of the program in South Africa under discussion here is the Tutu/Botha debate where the
South African government was represented by Foreign Minister Pik Botha. In the course of the
two week long broadcasts from each country a number of other prominent members of both
societies were interviewed.
Research Methodology
To be able to compare the behavior of media moderators with institutional (formal) third
parties such as mediators, one first needs to address another issue: What are the strategies,
tactics, and techniques (or overall roles) of third-party intervenors? The literature in this regard
offers no easy answers. The approaches to documenting and describing mediator behavior have
ranged from taxonomies of general mediator strategies to more focused listings of isolated
behavior (Jones, 1989). Most of these classifications (see Jones, 1989; Kochan and Jick, 1978;
Kressel and Deutsch, 1977) appear to be variations on Simkin's (1971) outline of mediator
strategies: communication tactics, substantive tactics and procedural tactics. Communication
tactics are process oriented, and assist the parties with mutual information gathering and
clarifying each other's views. Substantive tactics relate more to the issues in dispute such as costbenefit analysis, "reality checks," and making suggestions about possible solutions. Thirdly,
procedural tactics are purely process-oriented such as laying the ground rules for the format, the
sequencing of meetings and developing an agenda.
Jones' (1989) three third-party strategies—communication-facilitation, substantivedirective, and procedural—outline categories were more relevant to be utilized for a media
comparison. For example, communication-facilitation strategies, comprising of tactics such as
search for information (i.e., defining the dispute, clarifying, paraphrasing and summarizing),
supportive communication (i.e., explaining impartially and expressing empathy) and instruction
(i.e., explaining ground rules), seem comparable to the actions of media moderators. These
conflict analysis skills are clearly also the tools of the media intervenor’s trade, and hence, begs
a comparison.
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Substantive-directive strategies and its four tactics—discussing solutions, pressuring,
power balancing and formalizing agreement—bring us into the realm of actual conflict
resolution activities. Most journalists, including television moderators, would argue fervently
that they are not part of the decision making process of any dispute or its resolution. However,
the premise of this research is that many forms of journalism are involved in this process, not so
much by design, but by default. Merely by exposing outside parties such as the African National
Congress and the Palestinian Liberation Organization as full, and therefore equal, participants on
Nightline, the power balance between them and their interlocutors, the South African and Israeli
governments respectively, might be swayed. Nearly all forms of journalism about social conflict,
from daily print stories to radio and television interviews with one or more sides of the conflict,
inquire about possible solutions and the formalizing of agreements, whereby, like mediators,
they potentially influence the process of change. Challenging people's positions on an array of
issues, is therefore a fairly acceptable journalistic practice. And finally, most of the formal
mediator's procedural strategies, such as agenda setting, the use of caucuses (or interviewing
parties separately), as well as generally controlling the environment are also normal activities for
television moderators.
For the purpose of the content analysis, Wall’s (1981) and Wall and Lynn’s (1993)
approximately 100 mediator techniques, most of which are applied to the inter-negotiator
relationship, were used as the basis of the coding scheme. Among many other elements this
includes setting up the negotiations, establishing a protocol for negotiation, and controlling the
inter-negotiator relationship (i.e., regulating the communication, clarifying perceptions, striking
a balance between power positions and offering proposals).
Moderator Ted Koppel’s actions—statements, questions, and expressions—were the
units of analysis. For example, questions and statements that served to draw out information
(who, what, when, where, why, how) and viewpoints from the participants in a non-threatening,
non-critical manner, were deemed clarifying questions and labeled as manifest/overt/explicit
moderator tactics. In other words, Koppel’s statements (or actions) were coded as tactics or roles
(such as being a clarifying question), with respect to the effects they have or the functions they
serve. From this analysis emerged a taxonomy of Koppel’s tactics and strategies that blended
some journalistic techniques with some third party (that is conflict resolution) type strategies.
To illustrate, let us examine two questions asked by Koppel, one from each series of
programs—one in South Africa and one in Israel. First, the reference notation system for
excerpts should be explained. The reference begins with either "SA" for South Africa or "IS" for
Israel; followed by a number indicating the date; and finally a page number from the transcript
for that date. For example, the first question below comes from the week of broadcasts in South
Africa, specifically April 18, and page 11 of the transcript. The notation is therefore SA-18-11.
An example of the methodology is as follows:
(1) One first locates a sample of Koppel's interactions with the parties, such as, "When
you speak of that goal, Bishop... are you talking about one man, one vote…? (SA-1811) or, to take an example from the Israel broadcasts, "You, I take it, would consider
that a fairly reasonable, representative report, or in fact have we not shown all that
there is to show?" (IS-26-4).
(2) Each of these can then be described as simply a clarifying question.
(3) Because the tactic is quite clear from the words spoken, it can be labeled as
manifest/overt/explicit (as opposed to implicit or latent).
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(4) After completing steps one through three for the whole program, one looks for tactics
that seem to cluster naturally with this, such as asking for information and
explanation, and paraphrasing and summarizing the issues.
(5) This cluster of tactics seems to serve the broader strategy of eliciting information and
communication from the participants.
(6) This tactic is common to both third parties and media moderators.
Here is another example of this analytical process:
(1) Koppel asks, "Mr. Krause, is the policy of apartheid justifiable on moral and
religious grounds, do you think?" (SA-21-5), or, for a similar example from the Israel
broadcasts, "Mr. Olmert, it's one thing to talk about the military buying time for the
political leaders. You're one of the political leaders. What are they buying time for?
What are you fellows doing?" (IS-26-7).
(2) In contrast to the earlier examples, these serve not just to elicit information but to
confront or challenge. Therefore, they can be described as challenging questions.
(3) Again, the tactic can be linked to actual words spoken (text on the transcript), so it is
labeled as manifest/overt/explicit.
(4) Again, this tactic clusters well with others, in this case, making challenging
statements and playing parties off against each other.
(5) This cluster seems to serve the strategy of pressuring or pushing the participants
forward.
(6) This tactic is very conventional to media moderators. It is also used by many thirdparty intervenors, depending on style and personal approach.
Table 1, The Television Moderator's Manifest Tactics and Their Frequency, lists all the manifest
tactics identified in the two week long series of Nightline broadcasts–the moderator’s statements
and actions. The numerical columns indicate frequency of use, first in the South Africa series,
then in the Israel series. These manifest tactics are organized in descending order of overall
frequency of use.
A few initial caveats must also be issued concerning the data and how they should be
interpreted. First, in Table 1, every tactic is assigned two numbers indicating how often Koppel
used it: first in the South Africa series, then in the Israel series. There is some inherent
subjectivity in determining what exact statements and questions of the moderator fit those
tactics. For example, the interpretive lines between clarifying questions, challenging questions,
and reality checking were, inevitably at times, fairly indistinct. This kind of content analysis of
text is not an exact science. In spite of this fact, the numerical counts do give some sense of the
frequency with which a particular tactic was used, but not necessarily an exact or indisputable
one. This method fits what Robson (1993, p. 402) calls "quasi-statistics," which is the result of
having "data which, while in principle numerical, cannot be precisely quantified." However, the
actual numbers from the content analysis do provide specific markers and behavioral indicators.
At the same time, the presence or absence of a particular tactic is as important as how frequently
it was used.
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TABLE 1:
South
Africa

Israel

Ask challenging question
Ask clarifying question
Control turn-taking/air time
Introduce & describe participants
Make challenging statement
Stroke the participant
Orient parties toward future
Validate a party's point of view (including via
background pieces)
Elicit viewpoint/position
Play parties off against each other
Ask for information & explanation
Repeat challenging question
Reality-check
Warn "in-party" of consequences of their
behavior
Use hypothetical "what if" questions

33
30
22
7
7
6
8
3

25
17
21
9
8
8
5
10

3
7
8
4
3
2

10
5
3
4
5
6

1

7

Paraphrase/summarize the issue
Use humor to reduce tension
Express optimism about future cooperation
Describe & explain the process
Point out shared position
Express intent to be neutral
Provide face-saving
Minimize venting, history telling
Determine/establish "real" stake-holders
Emphasize parties' opposing positions
Contradict/debate participants
Ask for background/explanation
Present party with mirror image of itself
Accept blame for procedural problems
Allow participants to set substantive agenda
Attempt to extract a concession
Explain terminology to viewers
Encourage nonviolent negotiation
Empathize with emotion
Repeat statements from previous show for
continuity and entertainment

4
1
4
1
1
0
0
0
3
2
2
1
0
0
0
2
2
1
1
1

3
6
2
5
3
4
4
4
0
1
1
2
3
3
3
0
0
1
1
1

The Television Moderator’s Manifest
Tactics and their Frequency
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TABLE 1:
The Television Moderator’s Manifest
Tactics and their Frequency
Empathize with suffering on both sides
Inquire about outside pressures
Determine alliances among out-parties
Elicit options for change
Promote use of other third parties
Seek areas of agreement
Ask participants to stay focused on the issue
Appeal for civility
Explain program's journalistic role
Appeal for real dialogue
Point out benefits of participating in media
process
Verify accuracy of background piece

South
Africa

Israel

0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0

2
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0

1

In contrast to the examples of the media moderator’s manifest third party tactics in Table
1(tactics that were deduced directly from Koppel’s spoken words), a different set of third party
roles that are inherent to all third parties were inferred or implicitly deduced from the context.
The following lengthy excerpt from the South Africa programs embodies several of these latent
roles: bestowing credibility to participants, empowering/equalizing parties by bringing them
together, providing direct communication, and legitimizing the participants at the (electronic)
‘table’:
...In a moment, Bishop Tutu will be joining us from the office of his other
church here in Johannesburg. And we will also be joined by South African
Foreign Minister Pik Botha, who is in Cape Town. But first, a brief look at both
these men.
[voice-over] Last year, Bishop Desmond Tutu was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize for his role in leading the nonviolent campaign against apartheid. But
this first black Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg seems a most unlikely leader of
a moral crusade. There is about Bishop Tutu so much bubbling enthusiasm, such
a buoyant optimism, that it's easy to forget that this man is walking a political
tightrope from which he could tumble at any moment. Bishop Tutu, for example,
is widely thought to support the policy of disinvestment, which is, encouraging
mostly American businesses to pull out of South Africa as a moral gesture against
apartheid. But were he to openly support disinvestment, Bishop Tutu would face
up to five years in prison. The Bishop joins us from the study of his church in
Johannesburg.
The foreign minister of South Africa is almost universally known in this
country as Pik Botha. The “Pik” is an abbreviation of the Afrikaans word for
penguin. But as his adversaries have discovered, this is no man to be taken
lightly. He is one of the most popular politicians in South Africa. A former
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ambassador to the United Nations, he has always been an eloquent spokesman for
his government, charming, a brilliant debater, and some say an excellent actor
when necessary. Pik Botha is also said to have an explosive temper. Since 1980
he has been both minister of foreign affairs and information, sort of a combination
between George Shultz and Larry Speakes. Foreign Minister Botha joins us from
Cape Town, South Africa.
[on camera]Gentlemen, I'm very much appreciative that both of you could
join us this evening. Mr. Foreign Minister, it makes sense, since you are a senior
member of this government, that we would invite you. Let me explain to you
why we have invited Bishop Tutu. As you well know, in the eyes of many people
outside South Africa, Bishop Tutu is perhaps the best-known spokesman for the
disenfranchised in this country.... (SA-18-5)
In terms of manifest (overt) tactics, Koppel is simply introducing and describing the
participants. However, he is implicitly doing much more. From an earlier part of the transcript,
we know that these two men had never debated each other directly on television or in person.
Given that the overwhelming political power in South Africa at the time of the broadcast was in
the hands of the white apartheid government, out-party representatives were generally not given
this level of exposure on television, and the negotiating process itself did not start until much
later. By presenting the prominent anti-apartheid bishop and the government minister in an equal
manner, and by describing the bishop in favorable terms, Koppel and Nightline are clearly,
intentionally or unintentionally, empowering the out-party.
These latent—or deduced—roles address questions regarding the effect that media third
party intervention has on the parties or the negotiation process and that is not the focus of this
paper. Here we are mainly concerned with the moderator’s third party tactics and the extent to
which they conform to conventional third parties such as mediators. In analyzing the data from
Table 1, the notations in the discussion below, as before, refer to South Africa (SA) or Israel (IS)
followed by numbers that denote the date of the broadcast and the page number of the transcript
respectively.
The Media Moderator and Third Party Tactics: A Discussion
In analyzing the manifest tactics of television moderators there was a constant danger of
reading too much into the text—making assumptions about the moderator's intent, rather than
just evaluating the manifest or spoken words. The speaker or media moderator's intent, however,
can often also be deduced not only from the spoken words but also from the person's body
language and voice inflection. This was an important reason why the analysis of these
transcripts was done while simultaneously looking at the videotapes. Two instances of
interactions that Ted Koppel had with the participants during the town meeting in Israel illustrate
the problem:
...Mr. Olmert, it's one thing to talk about the military buying time for the political
leaders. You're one of the political leaders. What are you buying time for? What
are you fellows doing? [IS-26-7]
and,
But just based on the reality of where we are now, I'm not sure that the Arab world
will be enthralled by King Hussein entering into these negotiations, and King
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Hussein made it clear as recently as this past Sunday that he's not prepared to
represent the Palestinians. So what is that about? [IS-26-18]
While the context of this interaction as well as the speaker's inflection and body language
all assist in the interpretation of the tactic, it does not provide a clear picture of the speaker's
intent. Koppel's questions in the first example ["What are you buying time for? What are you
fellows doing?"] can be interpreted as merely asking for information or, within the context of the
sentence, can also be seen as being more than that, namely a challenging question. Similarly, did
he mean the question in the second example, "So what is that about?," to be simply clarifying of
the situation, or was he indeed challenging the previous speaker's (Mr. Olmert's) argument that it
is not possible to negotiate with the Palestinians without the presence of Jordan? Depending on
the tactic-evaluator's reading of the emotive nature of the situation, this question could be
deemed either as clarifying, challenging, or even reality checking. That there is a distinction to
be made between clarifying and challenging questions, however troublesome this might prove to
be because of different interpretations of context and intent, becomes very important in
comparing Koppel's third-party style in the South Africa programs versus the programs in
Israel/Palestine.
Another media moderator tactic that stands out is the use of face-saving. Face-saving is
clearly not a conventional journalistic role but it becomes conventional in the way Koppel uses
it. Although this tactic is only used four times throughout the ten programs and all four times in
the town meeting show in Israel, it plays out in a variety of ways. The fence between the Israelis
and Palestinians allowed both groups to pretend that they are separated from each other, saving
face with their constituents. This face-saving device also allowed them to pretend they are
communicating directly, and only with the moderator, while ultimately they would respond to
each other's arguments and points of view. At the same time, however, it provided the
conservative Israeli politicians on the program, specifically Ehud Olmert and Ben-Elissar, tools
to heckle the Palestinians with. The Palestinians managed to ignore these mocking statements
because Koppel assisted them in saving face by responding on their behalf:
[Ben-Elissar:] First of all, why don't you remove this fence? We don't need this
fence! Who needs this fence?
[Koppel:] The Palestinians need this fence.
[Ben-Elissar:] They need it. I know that maybe they need it. We don't need it. I
don't need it. The Israelis don't need this fence. If there is one thing that is sure
that is definitive, it is that in this country Arabs and Jews will have to live
together. Precisely as they will have to live forever--together in the Middle East.
There is no other choice. So we don't need this fence.
[Koppel:] They are here at our invitation. [IS-26-5]
Other than this conventional form of face-saving, a program such as Nightline can also
provide electronic face-saving. When parties are legally banned from meeting together, as has
been the case at times in both South Africa and Israel, or when or when one or the other refuse to
appear in the same room, satellite technology can bring them into the same ‘electronic room’ or
onto the same screen. This allows them to communicate via the moderator, or directly with the
moderator, while saving face by not being in the same location.
These examples of face-saving, though few in number, took various forms and their
presence were very important in comparing moderator and mediator third-party roles. Face-
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saving is a highly sophisticated mediator technique and its presence as a media moderator tactic,
is therefore significant in comparing the behavior of these two professional types. Koppel did
more face-saving for the Palestinians when he explained that one of their panelists, Dr. Mamdou
al-Akhar, "has the flu" [IS-26-4], when in all probability he had political "stage fright" and
decided he did not want to participate in this forum (Koppel and Gibson, 1986, p. 108).
This particular example of face-saving also underscores the fact that the television
moderator has similar getting-to-the-table difficulties as conventional third parties do. Both
participants and disputants who have agreed to join some kind of problem solving forum may for
a variety of reasons, decide to withdraw at the last minute. In both South Africa and in Israel the
producers had enormous problems in putting together panels of participants for their electronic
table. Even before getting to that point, they had to negotiate with the two governments in
question about entering into the major social conflict of each of these countries, as well as
negotiate the cooperation of the out-party leadership, the ANC, and the PLO.
In South Africa, the ABC producers made the naive assumption that often gets
inexperienced third parties into trouble, namely that at least the out-party would welcome their
presence. As producer Tara Sonenshine later noted: “We got caught in what was then still a lot of
division in the ANC between the far left and the middle. We went through elaborate negotiations to
try to get the ANC on board this thing (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, p. 72). Nightline’s producers had
similar problems in Israel. PLO chairman Arafat accepted Koppel's written explanation that "we
[Nightline] were hoping for the first time to present the Palestinian point of view, without
editing, and to present it on equal footing with the Israelis” (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, pp. 100101). However, putting together credible representative panels became a nearly insurmountable
problem (much of which was finally only managed because the producers agreed to the studio
"wall" that symbolically separated the parties).
In both South Africa and Israel the out-party organizations (the ANC and the PLO) were
banned, and their leaders jailed or in exile. Moreover, in Israel, because of the election in that
year, Israeli politicians feared that participation in “any kind of dialogue might result in
retribution at the polls” (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, p. 102). While Palestinian leaders such as
Haider Abdul-Shafi and Hanan Ashrawi shared the conviction "that it was time to challenge the
Israeli government in a public forum” (Koppel and Gibson, p. 1996: 103), they had historical,
political and personal reasons for not wanting to be seen with certain Israelis. They therefore
wanted to have some control over who were going to represent their side.
Koppel also realized in South Africa that their intervention might have unintended
consequences: "He worried over the show's possible political impact. Might it make a bad
situation worse?” (Koppel and Gibson, 1996, p. 73). In Israel, after Koppel and ABC News
president Roone Arledge had breakfast with the then Israeli defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin,
Arledge still feared on the morning of the broadcast that Rabin's conclusion that they were "nuts"
to attempt this television forum would come true:
...not only could there be violence, and there could be people killed, maybe, but on
top of that we would be the cause of it all. If something bad happened, it would not
only be a terrible event, but it would be indefensible that we went ahead, particularly
if people found out that Rabin told us that we were crazy (Koppel and Gibson, 1996,
p. 96).
The town meeting in the Jerusalem Theater finally went peacefully ahead after various
panels of participants were rejected by both sides. However, this history of events not only
illustrates how getting-to-the-table issues are shared by television moderators and conventional
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third parties, but it also points to the physical and other dangers these professionals share during
their different forms of intervening in national or international conflict.
From the initial manifest set of moderator tactics (Table 1), it is also interesting to note
that Koppel performed other roles that are not conventional for journalists such as encouraging
peacemaking (or non-violent negotiation). In general, the format of interviewing two or more
sides of a conflict simultaneously seems to produce a wider range of journalistic tactics and roles
than does the ordinary journalistic format of interviewing just one party at a time. This format
leads to a wide range of moderator tasks that are normally not enacted such as introducing and
describing participants, describing and explaining the process, and verifying the accuracy of the
(journalistic) background pieces.
Some Core Findings on the Media Moderator Strategies and Tactics
Beyond clarifying and challenging questions, the television moderator's most commonly
used tactics seemingly are procedural in nature. In an effort to be fair and neutral to all the
participants, Koppel controlled who spoke when and about what topic. This type of third-party
control seems to be much more rigid than the initial fairly unrestricted approach of conventional
mediators. This is especially true in the town meeting [IS-26] where Koppel did not only control
which side spoke to a particular point but, even which specific individual would address it. So
while both conventional and television third parties utilize this tactic, they seem to operationalize
it very differently. In contrast to this, a further procedural tactic, minimizing venting and history
telling is used fairly similarly. Both types of third parties seem to want to keep it to a minimum
in the interest of time and in trying to get the parties to focus on the future and not the past.
What is clear from Table 1 is that gaining information in various forms and facilitating
the communication between the parties are the main tactics of the television moderator, albeit
sometimes in a fairly challenging manner. This is vividly illustrated by the high frequency of
tactics that elicit communication such as asking clarifying questions, eliciting
viewpoints/positions, and asking for information and explanation. In addition, the pressurizing
tactic that is highest in number, asking a challenging question, while different in nature, can also
be viewed as a form of eliciting information. What is also notable from the frequency count is
that the television moderator makes use of a number of other important conventional mediator
tactics, although they are far fewer in number. Among them are orienting the parties towards
the future, stroking the participants, validating the parties' point of view, using humor to reduce
tension, and expressing the intent to be neutral.
The internal logic of these findings in Table 1, especially in the tactics that appeared with
the highest frequency, is related to the way in which the media moderator (Koppel) performed
roles that are very similar to that of a traditional mediator, yet with a distinctly journalistic
flavor. Like a traditional mediator he started out with ground rules, he then proceeded with a
number of clarifying questions within which the parties stated their positions and interests while
he found ways to control their turn-taking and air time in an ongoing fashion. However,
Koppel’s most often used manifest tactic was to ask challenging questions, a technique he used
very early on in the process of moderating these normally 90 minute long Nightline programs.
This is somewhat different from a traditional mediator who would normally resort to the use of
such a tactic much later in an intervention process. The journalistic nature of the media
moderator is also evidenced by the relatively high amount of times that Koppel played the
parties off against each other, and made challenging statements. In each of the program series
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he even contradicted and to a degree debated the participants on some points, which traditional
mediators would rarely do. While traditional mediators do reality testing with the parties it is
normally done in a more indirect and less confrontation manner.
In essence, however, the three most manifest tactics of the media moderator—to ask
challenging questions, and to ask clarifying questions mediator while keeping control of turn
taking and air-time—coincide with most frequently utilized techniques of a traditional mediator.
In an effort to be fair and neutral to all the participants, and obviously to make maximum use of
the program’s limited airtime, Koppel controlled who spoke when about what topic. This type of
third-party control seems to be much more rigid than the initial fairly unrestricted approach of
conventional mediators. This is especially true in the town meeting [IS-26] where Koppel did not
only control which side spoke to a particular point but also which specific individual would
address it. So while both conventional and television third parties utilize this tactic, they seem to
operationalize it very differently. In contrast to this, a further procedural tactic, minimizing
venting and history telling is used fairly similarly. Both types of third parties seem to want to
keep it to a minimum in the interest of time and in trying to get the parties to focus on the future
and not the past.
During these broadcasts, Koppel exhibited many of the strategies and skills that third
parties use, and did so quite adeptly. He stroked the participants when needed, provided facesaving when needed, used hypothetical what-if questions, oriented the parties’ towards the
future, and even expressed optimism about their future cooperation. His skill as a moderator was
clearly in evidence when he made challenging statements. He often prefaced a confrontational
question or statement with a softener, such as "I must tell you..." (IS-29-3) or a flattering
comment, referring to participants as "intelligent," "sophisticated," or "experienced" (IS-28-4).
In one instance during the town meeting in Israel, he adroitly reframed the main conflict issue in
such a way that it could be seen as a mutual issue, one that both parties could say was their own:
This business of recognition, it is mutual, it has become the Gordian knot of
Israeli-Palestinian relations. They [the Palestinians] say to you [the Israelis],
recognize our leadership, recognize our right to sovereignty. You say to them,
recognize our right to exist, recognize that we have a right to secure borders....
(IS-26-9).
This example of the television moderator's facilitation skills, raises the question of
whether such third-party techniques, while performed in a journalistic setting, will also have
other mediatory effects. These techniques and tactics of the television moderator are in nature
so similar to that of a conventional third-party that even if neither of the parties (participants)
saw their appearance on television as a problem solving exercise, it is quite feasible that it can
have such an outcome. The opposite is also quite possible: if parties use this forum to publicly
display their mutual dislike and distrust of each other, the result might be a deepening of the
conflict, especially if the moderator is not adept at facilitating highly adversarial debates. The
third-party skills of the moderator therefore becomes crucial to whatever consequences
television debates might have, other than educating the public and each other on their positions
and views. One way in which Koppel’s media moderating role contributed to the larger
negotiation processes in both cases was in the fact that he promoted the use of third parties
during the South Africa programs, and appealed for a real dialogue during the Israel programs.
Moreover, in spite of Koppel’s protestations to the contrary during these programs, based on this
list of his mediatory tactics he appears to be facilitating a negotiation between the parties on his
programs.
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The list of manifest tactics in Tables 1 illustrate the extent to which television public
affairs moderators perform third-party strategies and tactics in bringing conflicting parties
together on television and also how these moderators perform in ways that are different
compared to conventional third-party intervenors. The data indicate that Koppel clearly
performed traditional third party roles as a part of a media debate format that has a strong
resemblance to the structure of mediatory intervention processes. Although he enacted these
third roles in many ways similar to that of the traditional mediator, they differ in nature as well
as in style.
These differences in the tactics of the media moderator pertain mostly to the fact that his
is a mainly journalistic task. What is therefore clear from Table 1 is that gaining information in
various forms and facilitating the communication between the parties are the main tactics of the
television moderator. This is vividly illustrated by the high frequency of tactics that elicit
communication such as asking clarifying questions, eliciting viewpoints/positions, and asking for
information and explanation. In addition, the pressurizing tactic that is highest in number,
asking a challenging question, while different in nature, can also be viewed as a form of eliciting
information. What is also notable from the frequency count is that the television moderator
makes use of a number of other important conventional mediator tactics, although they are far
fewer in number. Among them are orienting the parties towards the future, stroking the
participants, validating the parties' point of view, using humor to reduce tension, and expressing
the intent to be neutral.
Journalism mythology, or how journalists view their role in society, also is a factor in the
interpretation of some other unintended television moderator strategies, namely those that relate
to putting pressure on the parties, balancing power and empowering the parties. While
journalists on the whole declare these roles as beyond their scope of operation, these phenomena
are unintended or spin-off effects of the journalistic task.
Media Debates as Potential Problem Solving Dialogues: A Conclusion
The contribution that television debates can make to resolving conflict is related directly
to the degree to which the media third parties, or moderators, of such programs, transform
adversarial debates on television into problem solving dialogues. While dialogues are supposed
to “enhance safety and promote respectful exchange,” debates are often characterized by attacks
and interruptions (Becker, et al., 1995, p.150). The Nightline case studies under discussion fell
squarely into the debate category. They occurred in a competitive atmosphere in which the
parties wanted to improve their positions at the expense of the other, rather than using the
programs cooperatively, “as a device for promoting problem-solving toward mutually acceptable
agreements” (Hopmann and Druckman, 1991, p. 282). Pre-meeting contacts between the parties
who appeared on these programs in both Israel and South Africa were not possible because of
the years of distrust and tension between them. In both cases, there was no guarantee that the
parties would even address each other, in fact, in a number of cases, the participants insisted that
they would only be on Nightline if they could speak to moderator Ted Koppel directly. While
Koppel attempted to move the discussions (especially the town meeting in Israel) into a dialogue
where parties attempt to analyze and problem solve, the participants inevitably reverted back to
confrontational tactics.
According to Burton, third parties acting as catalysts and facilitators are responsible for
transforming confrontational processes into problem solving exercises (Bercovitch, 1984).
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However, while journalists, and especially media moderators, perform such roles in dealing with
two sides of a conflict, they perform them relatively unconsciously and invariably without taking
any responsibility for bringing the parties closer to any form of resolution. Because producers of
public affairs programs do not always succeed in finding program participants who directly
represent decision-makers, they often find, as Slim and Saunders (1995: 2) suggest for their
sustained dialogues, “respected participants who reflect key viewpoints in their communities...”
The problem, however, is that media dialogues, unlike interactive conflict resolution models (see
Fisher, 1997; Rothman, 1992), are hardly ever sustained over months, and therefore become a
form of media voyeurism that does not take any responsibility for its social intervention. If done
correctly, and in more than just one week long program series, as was the case with Nightline’s
interventions in both South Africa and Israel, media dialogues do have the potential to have
many of the same roles as sustained dialogues: mapping the relationships, finding common
ground, building future scenarios, and generating a will to change, which in this case, is also the
public’s will to change.
Another reason why media dialogues tend not to have social impact is that they approach
conflict in the same way that most problem solving approaches do, by not challenging power
relations and institutions and thereby becoming agents of the status quo. However, as can be
illustrated from the case studies, media dialogues can in several ways be compared to other
forms of conflict resolution in terms of their conflict transformation potential. Using Väyrynen’s
(1991, pp. 4-6) terminology in this regard, Nightline’s involvement in South Africa clearly
assisted with “actor transformation,” by allowing for the emergence and legitimization of black
activists against apartheid on South African and international television. In both Israel and South
Africa, the out-parties argued that their participation on the Nightline programs made a
qualitative difference in how they were perceived after that, and in the recognition that it gave
them as spokespeople for a specific point of view. In that sense, because these programs treated
all its participants as equals, they matched Väyrynen’s definition of “structural transformation”
by altering the distribution of power between the actors and by bringing about a qualitative
change in their relationship. Just as many of the transformational outcomes of dialogue processes
are unintended, most of the changes that occur in conflicts due to the interventions of the media
were not intended by the media actors. However, most journalists and definitely media
moderators understand that parties in conflict use them for their own interests in return for
participating in such programs.
As Väyrynen points out, there were similarities between the Israeli-Palestinian and the
South African conflicts of the mid to late ‘80s. Just as the United States and Israel refused to
deal with the PLO and attempted to negotiate with the Arab states about the conflict, the South
African government refused to negotiate with the ANC and instead attempted to circumvent the
situation by dealing with the various ethnic homeland leaders. In both the Nightline series in
Israel and in South Africa, while not being able to necessarily bring the leaders of the out-parties
to the table, the programs showcased their internal representatives such as Hanan Ashrawi and
Desmond Tutu respectively, and thereby legitimated them as the true out-parties to the conflict.
By empowering the out-parties in this way in South Africa, and in Israel by giving the
Palestinian side a hearing during the height of the intifada, Nightline “unintendedly,” to use
Väyrynen’s terminology, portrayed the ANC and the PLO on equal footing with the South
African and Israeli governments, and thus became part of the conflict’s transformation. The
impact of the media in empowering out-parties, and thereby playing a transformational role, will
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unquestionably be greater under circumstances of impoverished communication between the
parties, as was evident in both case studies.
More importantly, the findings of this research pertaining to the number of similar media
roles between media moderators and conventional mediators lend further credence to Arno’s
conceptualization of media actors as third parties in conflict. It has therefore, as Arno (1984, p.
238) contends, become essential for conflict analysts, as well as media researchers to “look at the
media themselves as important actors in conflict situations at both the national and the
international levels.”
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POLICY-MAKING AND CONNECTIONS TO VIOLENCE:
A CASE STUDY OF INDIA*

Marie Olson Lounsbery and Frederic S. Pearson
Abstract
This paper explores the role of identity-based, or discriminatory, policy in facilitating the
outbreak of ethnopolitical violence in India. A discriminatory policy is the merging of
communal group identity with the state apparatus. It is argued that as the Indian government
enacts policies beneficial or discriminatory to particular identity groups within the country,
other groups feel threatened. Groups who feel disadvantaged by the policy may begin to fear for
their own security and political interests motivating them to rebel. When focusing on Indian
policy and ethnopolitical violence during the period 1945 to 2000, the authors find that,
although there are many cases of seemingly spontaneous episodes of violence, when identitybased policies do occur, they are often followed by violence and/or protest.
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the international system seemed ready to
experience a new era of peace. However, the “New World Order” predicted by then US
President George H. W. Bush turned out to be something quite different. Although the
occurrence of interstate war diminished substantially after 1989, internal conflicts continued to
rage at an alarming rate throughout the world (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1999), and to put
pressure on outside powers considering possible intervention. Scholars who once focused their
attention on superpower rivalry now turned to internal war, and more specifically, “ethnic
conflict.”1 An explosion of efforts ensued to find out what causes these highly destructive and
often intractable conflicts, how they can be managed or resolved, and ideally how to detect the
conditions necessary or sufficient for ethno political violence before it breaks out, i.e., “early
warning.”
As researchers attempt to grapple with the complexity of intrastate warfare, we seek to
contribute to our understanding of what conditions trigger violent ethno political outbreaks. We
propose to test, at least in one very large and diverse state, the general hypothesis that ethno
political conflict is often a reaction to governmental policy initiatives or changes. One key
aspect of policy change entails what might be described as inherent discrimination, i.e., moves
designed or structured to benefit one identity group in society at the expense of others. Such a
policy can be viewed as incorporating group identity into state policy. It establishes one group
as higher in status than others, and as a result, creates a need for disadvantaged groups to defend
their status.
Clearly, all government policies are designed to provide something for someone or some
group. It is proposed here though that policy providing systematic advantage to certain
communities, or disadvantage to others, can be viewed as a catalyst for violence. We use the
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term “catalyst” advisedly, since we suppose that other factors fully account for the violence, and
indeed we examine a few of these in relation to policy change.
In constructing policy changes it has been argued that leaders might blunder in trying to
alleviate social conflict through policy reform without fully considering such factors as
economic inequalities, territorial dissatisfaction, the number, relation, size, and location of ethnic
communities, international involvement or support, and the legacies of colonial and political
history. It also has been observed that aggressive and opportunistic leaders take advantage of
such conditions and the bitterness they engender to incite violence for their own political
purposes (Rupesinghe, 1988; Kaufman, 1996; Williams, 1994). One expression of efforts at
policy reform or of opportunism is the enactment of discriminatory measures, regulations, and
legislation.
We seek to determine if, when, and by what sequences such discriminatory policy leads
toward or away from violence, allowing for the fact that “discrimination” can be a subjective
concept, and indeed might even have positive effects if it empowers or “liberates” previously
oppressed groups (often argued in the context of American affirmative action legislation). If a
consistent pattern of outcomes emerges for certain types of policies, such policy initiatives could
be clear signs or signals for those interested in preventing or ameliorating social violence.
However, it is not yet clear what types of policies have predictable effects and under what
circumstances.
Although some studies have hinted at the idea of policy change leading to violent civil
conflict (Gurr, 1996; Stavenhagen, 1996), the violence is often referred to as the by-product of
other factors. Clearly conditions of domestic disruption can condition the ways policies are
perceived. For example, during the American civil war in the 1860s, the effort, however
reluctant, to emancipate slaves, led to reported ethnic backlash among groups recruited or
conscripted to fight in the war; the war’s economic and social dislocations, the high attrition rate
and forced nature of the draft, may have exacerbated this pattern of ethnic and class tension,
leading for example to anti-war riots among the lower classes in ethnically diverse New York
City.
Ideally one would want to conduct a study of discriminatory policy over many nations
and time-periods. However, the necessity of mapping a large body of policy change events and
effects across time dictates a more focused initial approach to one country. India presents an
excellent case for study because of its extensive ethnic diversity, encompassing different and
overlapping tribal, linguistic, religious, and cultural (including caste) identities spread across a
wide and varied geography, with a long history of periodic ethnic uprisings and communal
violence alongside efforts at reform, collaboration and regional or national cohesion. The origin
of much of this communalism in the contemporary context has been traced to forms of indirect
colonial rule, pitting identity groups against each other and utilizing local traditional rulers,
combined with the development of modern nationalism (Pandy, 1990; Barnett, 1976). If we can
better understand the patterns by which these processes subsequently have unfolded in this large
and pivotal democratic state, we can formulate propositions about ethnic violence for further
testing abroad.
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Identity Based Violence
Factors that contribute to interstate war have been documented and tested by many
scholars in the fields of conflict studies and international relations (see Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Cashman, 1993; Midlarsky, 1989). Unfortunately, quantitative or behavioral
methodologists relatively neglected analysis of civil or internal wars during the Cold War period,
except perhaps for the links between civil and interstate war (Maoz, 1989; Haas, 1968; Rummel,
1968; Tanter, 1966; Zinnes and Wilkenfeld, 1971; Wilkenfeld, 1972). Although this linkage
research continues and has been increasingly helpful to the field in general, it does not reveal
why some countries experience domestic unrest, rebellion, or uprisings and others do not.
Those scholars who focused specifically on intrastate or civil war often dealt with how
these conflicts end and the success or failure of negotiated settlements (Licklider, 1993 and
1995). At a less intense level than civil wars, scholars also have looked at internal conditions of
communal conflict and anti-government rebellion. Perhaps the most extensive work in this area
is that of Ted Robert Gurr (1970; 1993), who argues that rebellion stems from politicized
discontent, a condition he believes arises from relative deprivation.2 Ethnopolitical conflict,
therefore, is motivated by perceived discrimination, and discontent can be exacerbated by
economic or social conditions and mobilized by political entrepreneurs in order for internal
unrest to occur.
Gurr (1996) has taken his Minorities at Risk project further to develop a model for early
warning of identity-based violence that he illustrates using data from 56 Asian minorities. He
has identified what he believes to be risk factors for groups already engaged in serious forms of
rebellion. The factors that would lead to armed violence include: collective incentives, the
capacity for joint action, and external opportunities. In addition to relative deprivation, other
incentives for communal uprising include a loss of collective autonomy and previous experience
of repression by dominant groups, all factors that can relate to or be expressed in governmental
policy.3 The conditions that Gurr identifies as shaping regime responses to collective action are
a history of elite reliance on coercion, duration and strength of the democratic experience, and
the regime’s domestic power and resources. These risk factors, as Gurr (1996) explains, are not
to be used as predictors of violent conflict, but rather can be coded in order to provide a country
with a risk score, similar to our notion of looking at policy change as a catalyst.
Beyond the important concept of relative deprivation itself, the next question is what
causes sufficient discontent or insecurity that individuals would be willing to politicize, mobilize,
and possibly fight to the death? Gurr’s risk factor model is based on discontent forming from
economic, political, and cultural discrimination, as well as a history of state repression or lost
political autonomy. All of these factors can be viewed as some sort of group discrimination.
Although Gurr acknowledges that a major change in the structure of a political regime may be a
factor in violent civil conflict, his model posits that this change provides a window of
opportunity for identity groups that are already experiencing discrimination.
Elaborating on the window of opportunity thesis, we speculate that governmental policy
rather than or in conjunction with institutional change also might spark group discontent/fear and
lead to violence. In a presidential address to the International Studies Association, Gurr (1994),
analyzing conflicts during the 1993-94 period, developed the importance of political changes
within governments as a condition present prior to war. He found that half of the conflicts
occurred after “power transitions” which compromised any one of three different events: a
national upheaval (as defined by Harff, 1986), revolutionary changes in power, or transitions to
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democracy. In addition, these conflicts are more intense than conflicts that do not follow power
transitions. Upheavals, revolutionary power shifts, and democratic transitions all may entail or
relate to specific policy moves, though such moves, of course, can occur without these major
institutional changes. In the Indian context the 1977 parliamentary election, ousting the
Congress Party after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s authoritarian and ethnically manipulative
policies, is often seen as a key turning point in the sustenance of Indian democracy (Weiner,
1978). Thus it may not be so much the revolutionary changes in power or institutions per se as
the policies and measures officially adopted before or after the political transition that makes the
situation volatile.
This study, therefore, is designed to determine which of these various types of factors has
the greatest impact on subsequent identity based violence. It seems clear from Gurr’s research
that internal power dynamics are a significant factor, but it is not clear whether they always are a
precondition of violence. Using a case study format on information provided by area specialists,
Stavenhagen (1996) argues that violence may be inherent in the process of state-formation and
nation building. In order to understand the roots of the conflict one has to look at how the
modern state was originally established. A modern state relates to the different ethno-cultural
groups within its borders through constitutional provisions, electoral systems, legislation or
political culture and practice. The nation-state thus often has a dominant identity group (or
related groups) and one or more subordinate identity groups. This creates a struggle by the
lower status group(s) for recognition. Stavenhagen also argues that these conflicts include two
competing notions of the term ‘nation.’ The modern state system requires that nations show a
united front, yet identity groups, when asked to conform or assimilate, often feel stronger loyalty
to their “identity nation.” This can present grave challenges to a large union such as that of the
Indian subcontinent.4
Although Stavenhagen does not present an early warning system as Gurr does, he argues
that in order to overcome the inherently conflictive nature of the nation-state system, states must
abandon their emphasis on assimilation. He further proposes that democratic states are better
able to prevent these types of conflicts because they tend to de-emphasize assimilation and
ethnic politics. However, as India clearly shows, democracy itself might be caught up in the
turmoil of defining group rights and responsibilities and might or might not be able to quell the
tendencies toward violence in specific instances. Thus, Sisk (1996) argues that despite the
attractiveness of democracy as a form of government, it might not always be more peaceful,
particularly in multicultural societies. Democracy, according to Sisk, will create a security threat
when a win at the polls means a physical threat to the minority; this has been seen in recent
years, for example, in fears of an emerging democratically elected Islamic state in Algeria. In
countries where hostilities between competing identity groups are high, the will of the majority
may mean policies of assimilation or extinction. As a result, he discusses the benefits of
consociational approaches (i.e. power sharing) to identity-based conflicts at the national level.
States such as India have experimented with these approaches, in the form of officeholding and educational quotas, with varied and not always peaceful outcomes. Such quotas,
reserved places, and related set-aside policies themselves can become causes of contention,
conflict, or riotous violence. India’s long struggle with policies toward the “scheduled”
classes— “Untouchable” castes—illustrates these outcomes, with other castes periodically
refusing to cooperate in the system (Joshi, 1982). In addition, India has evolved complex and
subtle norms related to assimilation, reflecting a tension between those who went through the
independence struggle for the united homeland and those in regional areas who were then
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expected to submerge their local identities to the national myth.5 One expression of this tension
is in the area of language law, where a system evolved to recognize Hindi as the nominal
national language, but to allow local languages to flourish and to revert to English at times as a
lingua franca. One student of Indian democracy has noted that ethnic separatist movements, as
seen among the Tamils, Sikhs, and Muslims across the years, are to be expected as expressions
of self-determination in multicultural democracies, and that they can be accommodated
depending upon how well the central authority is institutionalized and upon the willingness of
leaders, central authorities, and ruling groups to share power and resources with the mobilized
protesters (Kohli, 1997). Thus a combination of institutional capability and policy reform is seen
as the key to stability.6
As with assimilation, resource distribution can become a crucial bone of contention in
post-colonial societies,7 but how governmental leaders legislate that distribution, again the
expression of or reaction to inequality via policy, is crucial to understanding the causes of violent
civil conflict. Either mass-led or elite-led policy demands can lead to violence despite their
vastly different motivations.
In sum, those who have examined the history of ethnic relations in India have noted
many accommodations and norms aimed at managing tensions even apart from governmental
policy, often quite successfully. Manor (1996, pp.461-462) shows how four different strands of
ethnic identity—religious, language, tribal/caste, and regional tribal—cross-cut in the Indian
context and how Indians tend to give priority to different levels of identity as circumstances
change, thus blurring or diminishing permanent conflict fault lines. The Japanese also have
displayed the ability to combine ethno-cultural traits, for example adopting multiple religious
practices.
Because Indian society is so heterogeneous, and because the country and its
population are so large, people. . .have a wide array of identities available to
them. These include at least three different kinds of caste identities. . ., religious
identities. . .,and identifications with clans and lineages—as well as linguistic,
class, party, urban/rural, national, regional, subregional and local identities, and
sometimes varying types of ‘tribal’ identities too. The crucial point is that Indians
tend not to fix on any one of these identities fiercely and permanently, as groups
in places like Sri Lanka have done. (p. 463)
Discriminatory Policy Change
While cross-cutting identities are reassuring for Indian democratic stability, periodic
scenes of frenzied communal killing, raids, and counter raids still leave us with the question of
when the pattern of live and let live breaks down, when the cross-cutting buffers lose their
cushion, and when polarization becomes more acute. One suspects again that policy moves have
something to do with this timing, along with exogenous or systemic pressures such as economic
change or institutional breakdown.8 Of course as Manor (1996, p. 465) notes, because of the
diversity of ethnic cues, such as Hinduism’s multiple gods and texts, even when politicians try to
enforce disruptive or polarizing policy changes, as in the efforts by the Hindu right to make the
god Ram the pre-eminent deity across all India, there is considerable natural resistance.
Those who have studied Indian ethnic and particularly religious violence present a
pattern of episodic ups and downs (Manor, 1996, pp. 467-468). “These marked fluctuations in
levels of religious violence are intimately connected to the fluidity with which people in India
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shift their preoccupations from one identity to another (p. 467).” But they also at times are
related to policy irritants such as Indira Gandhi’s machinations to weaken ethnic opponents by
dividing them and pitting potential opponents against each other in an overall pattern of power
centralization (Manor, 1996, pp. 471-472).9
Generally, then, this view opens the whole question of the state’s role in fomenting or
diminishing inter-group tensions and violence. This is illustrated in the history of Indian
language policy. As with Manor’s contention about crosscutting identities, it has been argued
that language diversity both within and between Indian states precludes a forced homogenization
and reinforces pluralism. Fearing the possible breakup of the state in the 1950s, Jawaharlal
Nehru resisted Congress pressures to redraw state boundary lines to conform to language
differences; he hoped to avoid secessionist movements by intermixing language groups
throughout. Thus in a sense non-policy change represented a forceful policy to preserve the
newly independent Indian Union. Still, boundaries were occasionally redrawn along linguistic
lines, though according to Manor (1996, p. 466), the other dividing traits among common
language speakers held sway and prevented any single Indian state from moving forcefully for
separation. Group based secessionist movements have formed in the Northeast, Punjab during
the 1980s, and Kashmir, and the state authorities have alternated between sometimes clumsy
repression and halting efforts at reform, sometimes compounding problems as in recent ideas
about enforcing a national identity card system to stifle cross-border tribal infiltration, without
definitively resolving the discontent.
After reviewing the literature, it seems reasonable that certain types of policy change may
in fact be a key to understanding violent civil conflict. Olzak and Tsutsui (1998) link non-violent
protest and violent uprisings to three sets of variables reflecting: world system influences,
national civil rights policies, and the state’s international networks. They predict for example
that declining levels of internal inequality might intensify ethnic mobilization and strife as
threatened groups or classes dig in their heels (they predict this to be the case more in states of
the economic “core” of world politics than in the disadvantaged “periphery”), and that countries
granting more civil liberties might suffer higher levels of ethno political violence, though
perhaps lower levels of non-violent protest, because of the loosening of restraints and repression
(up to a point of satisfaction with greatly expanded rights). Inequality and human rights, of
course, are both subject to policy reforms and allocations. Findings from this multi-national
study (pp. 706-712), though, cast doubt on the hypothesized relationships about effects of
inequality and freedom in the world’s core and periphery, although violence levels in the core
were higher than often predicted by those who merely assume that poverty breeds protest and
rebellion.
This evidence leads us to hypothesize that shifts in governmental policy that either
benefit or threaten a dominant group in a society solidify group reaction; dominant groups
fearing lost ground or subordinate groups fearing extinction and suppression are motivated to
acquire countervailing power, territory, security, etc. (Horowitz, 1985).
Polarization through state policy making can occur in two ways, as we have seen in the
literature: (1) by pretending that group differences do not exist or are unimportant, thereby
seeking to homogenize the society; or (2) by first recognizing different identity groups but then
incorporating those differences into policy in a way which systematically discriminates against
certain groups. In either case, intra-group bonds are strengthened and inter-group bonds are
weakened. The group, or groups, that expect or experience policy discrimination begin to
distance themselves from the dominant group that is seen as benefiting unduly. With distance,
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there tends to be a lack of communication; therefore, barriers are created that make resolving
tensions difficult (Lake and Rothchild, 1996). In societal polarization, groups do not maintain
the crosscutting ties or allegiances that limit conflict potential (Ross, 1993) and have been shown
to be so important for India.
Depending upon circumstances, the supposed advantages provided the dominant group
might cause a fear of extinction or a fear of assimilation in the others. In an analysis of Bolivia,
Albó (1994) argues that society was organized as if everyone belonged to the dominant group;
this created the potential for violent Bolivian conflict by denying the relevance of those who did
not belong to the Hispanic culture. This again is a pattern reminiscent of feared ethnocide and is
a stronger form of fear than that perhaps picked up by Olzak and Tsutsui’s measures. Some
countries, such as Turkey, do not readily recognize the multi-cultural characteristic of their
nation; therefore, policies designed to homogenize the state create fear of fatal assimilation, as
among Kurds and Armenians. Other states’ policies, as in Rwanda and Burundi, are designed
specifically to rid the country, or parts thereof, of one or more identity groups. This obviously
generates a fear of extinction. The two types of fear are not mutually exclusive. Forced
assimilation can also be viewed as a form of extinction. The “bottom line” is that such policies
generate fear that certain identity groups will not be able to survive or thrive within their
homeland (Rothman, 1997).
It is interesting to note that although inter-group violence is still prevalent in India—
indeed in incidents such as the widespread Hindu attacks on Muslims in Gujarat state in the
summer of 2002 as a response to perceived Muslim terror on railroads and in Kashmir and New
Delhi—the general trend appears to have been toward expression of such fears and resentments
mainly in violence directed at the state.
“Diverse groups do not simply vent their anger at the state but often also hold it
responsible for the injustices they seek to address. Hindu nationalists allege that
the central government appeases the Muslim minority; the upper-caste youths
who
immolated themselves in 1990 accused the government of discriminating against
the so-called forward castes. . .; and regional movements demanding greater
rights to self-determination have accused the national government of
discriminatory allocation of resources and undue political interference at the state
level.” (Basu and Kohli, 1997, p. 321).10
Thus, the central government has come to be seen, accurately or not, increasingly as the
repository of policymaking (either direct or indirect) that for better or worse, can affect the
balance among ethnic communities. In the case of rioting against caste emancipation policy, for
example:
“. . .all of these seemingly diverse examples of conflict—over urban jobs and
education, land, and the ritual purity of the village well—do indeed prove to have
much in common. Each in its own way is a dispute over the Indian “social
contract” and the state’s role in enforcing that contract. The issue in these cases
is not so much ‘law and order’ as ‘whose law, whose order.’ (Joshi, 1982, p. 682).
In India as well, the situation is complicated in that,
Many ‘communal’ riots have indeed been precipitated by discord between
provincial and central governments and between local and national
administrators. In other instances. . .community leaders and state representatives
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have worked together to prevent or contain violence. (Basu and Kohli, 1997, p.
322).11
Discriminatory policies might consist of one specific measure or a series or repetition of
enforcement actions, decisions, laws, rules or regulations. Of course as noted, the mere proposal
of such policies might also have its effects. Discussion or adoption of the discriminatory policy
is volatile because of what it symbolizes to the potentially disadvantaged group or groups;
therefore the actual number of policies adopted is not necessarily a factor in predicting violence,
but their sequence and timing might be.
Relative deprivation, economic disparities and hardships, rising expectations and
discontent play a role in magnifying the effects of discriminatory policy change. The key
question is whether the proposed or enacted policy keeps certain members of a society from
obtaining their “rightful” capabilities and aspirations. It is not even necessary that policy reflects
the intent of discrimination for violence to follow; if the policy symbolizes discrimination for the
dominant or subordinate, the group may respond based on threat perception alone. Groups
which are being discriminated against in reference to others or which have been advantaged in
the past but now find their status threatened by social trends or more pointedly by governmental
reforms are more likely to rebel violently than groups that previously had not hoped for or
experienced advancement.
General discontent results from all of these processes particularly when newly
discriminating measures are adopted.12 Such changes will tend to shake up the status quo,
affording or seeming to afford new and special status to some groups; others will experience
threats (physical or existential) and hostility.13 Indian policies aimed at emancipating the
“Untouchables” for example are seen by many traditional elites as threatening the underpinnings
of the entire social system and therefore are strongly resisted even as they are passed into law by
a concerned national parliament and a party system that might depend on a massive vote among
the poor (Joshi, 1982, p.682). Thus, policies that threaten the status quo might be the most likely
to breed not just protest but outright violence, and reactions to such “threatening” policies can
breed strange alliances, as between richer and poorer higher caste Indians.
Obviously, not all ethnically related policy decisions will result in civil violence. Certain
variables would seem to be crucial, especially when incorporated into official policy. As noted,
discriminatory policy changes are those that could systematically advantage one group within a
society and disadvantage another. The key policies likely to have this effect are related to
language, religion, educational, economic (e.g., job access), and political status (such as land
holding and citizenship rights). These variables are not mutually exclusive; a group might feel
that language policy would also disadvantage them politically and economically, for example.
Clearly, policies can involve more than one type of reform at once and do not happen in a
vacuum. Numerous factors might contribute to the adoption of a discriminatory policy or deter
such a policy from adoption. Other factors could either dampen or magnify a policy’s likelihood
of provoking violence. For purposes of comparison, in this analysis we also record nondiscriminatory or non-identity policy changes, both proposed and enacted.
In our analysis we also allow for the possibility that various types of identity-based
policy can have either destructive or constructive effects, and that they can be seen subjectively
as either harmful or beneficial. Therefore, we introduce the concept of “positive discriminatory
policy,” which is taken to mean a tendency to benefit or protect the minority or traditionally
disadvantaged against the majority or traditionally advantaged population in a given
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circumstance. “Negative discriminatory policy” would have the converse effect of protecting or
benefiting the majority or advantaged. We wish to see whether it matters if discrimination is
positive or negative in predicting the probability of violent or non-violent reaction.
Some studies have shown that moves in certain policy domains might breed more
tendencies to violent reaction. Among these, for example, language policy has been cited as
potentially volatile in a state like India. Below we review expectations regarding some of these
domains.
• Language. Often states do not recognize the importance of linguistic differences in
maintaining domestic peace. For example, in countries such as Latvia and Moldova after the
cold war ended, state language reform disadvantaged those, such as Russians, that did not
speak the primary national language or did not consider it their first language. In a
multiethnic society such as India’s with several prevalent languages, national or regional
language legislation and policy carries great portent. Horowitz (1985, p. 219) argues that
when a particular language is provided an exclusive official status it becomes a symbol of
domination and thus presumably a great cause of bitterness and resentment of the type that
can spur violence. Cultural fear of domination may, in fact, play a large role in contributing
to group level rebellion, since group members feel they might lose control of their way of life
(Donnelly, 1996). In a study of India and Northern Ireland, Bostock (1997) identified
“language grief” (the anticipation of or reaction to language loss or extinction) as a major
contributor to conflict. On the other hand, Laitin (1993) finds the potential for fighting over
language, especially in India and he would argue, controversially, Sri Lanka, to be muted
because this issue almost automatically leads to a bargained outcome. It is hypothesized
here, for purposes of study, that because of India’s linguistic diversity and the dampening of
linguistic polarization across Indian states, language policy reform will be less volatile than
other forms of perceived policy discrimination.
• Religion. The processes involving religion and violent civil conflict are similar to those of
language. The same sense of domination and discrimination occurs. With the end of the
Cold War, and the increased interdependent nature of the international system, it seemed
likely that economic concerns would take priority over religious differences. However, some
scholars argue that the societal importance of religion is growing despite increased global
economic interdependence (Bangura, 1994; Haynes, 1995). Reinforcing the salience of
religion in conflict, Reynal-Querol (2002) tested the notion that religiously diverse
multicultural states will be more violence prone than linguistically diverse states, with
findings that religious polarization and anamist diversity (number of followers of anamist
culture) do in fact explain incidence of civil war better than linguistic polarization. It follows
from her work (2001) that consociational policies protecting minorities work better than
majoritarian democracy to keep ethnic cleavages at bay.
Both the aforementioned caste controversy and the Sikh and Kashmir disputes in India show
how aspects of religion and religious practice, as in the controversy and violence surrounding
the sanctity of the Golden Temple of Amritsar, become politicized as forms of nationalism
leading to violence. It is often difficult to determine exactly when a religious movement
becomes a political movement. One must look for various forms of organized resistance,
campaigns or uprisings, the use of sanctuaries, and note the counter tendencies of
government to enforce policies on religious groups. Thus it is hypothesized here that
religious policy, because of its increasing politicization, will be the area of Indian political
life most subject to violent ethnic outbreaks.
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Economic and Political Status. Gurr (1994) has measured economic and political
discrimination as variables that he considers important in studying disadvantaged minorities.
Groups unable to satisfy their needs within the system will seek satisfaction in some other
way. When governmental policy is seen as the source of discrimination, or is blamed for
failing to solve economic ills in a context where scapegoating of other ethnicities is possible,
the result can be inter-ethnic or anti-government violence. Economic and political policies
would include regulations and legislation dictating land and resource rights, employment and
educational opportunities, as well as affecting citizenship or denying autonomy rights.

Various significant political events were included in the study for exploratory purposes.
Because of the economic stresses in a country of India’s size and the still unresolved rights of
minorities in some regions (such as the Northeast), it is hypothesized that economic and political
reforms will follow religion as India’s next most destabilizing policy domain.
It is argued here that discriminatory policies are neither necessary nor sufficient “causes”
of ethno political violence. When seeking to explain such a complex phenomenon, it is
important to recognize that no one factor alone could claim responsibility. Certainly the policy
environment is important to keep in mind when assessing actual policy impact. As a result, the
current study incorporates two policy environmental factors as contextual variables: executive
party shift and economic fluctuation.
Several studies have identified the importance of regime change as a precipitant of civil
violence. As noted earlier, Gurr (1994) included “power transitions” as a strong predictor of
such violence. It seems feasible that such situations might open the door to possible identitybased policy changes as indicated earlier. Similarly, other scholars have focused specifically on
democratization, finding positive correlation between semi-democratic regimes and violence
(Hegre, et al., 2001; Henderson and Singer, 2000; Ellingsen, 2000). India, however, has
remained strongly democratic, for the most part, according to Gurr (1997) and the Polity IV
democracy project. On the other hand, party shifts have occurred. As a result, the policy-toviolence linkage will be explored in relation to executive leadership changes.
In addition, several scholars have identified economic factors, and particularly downturns
as important in explaining the incidence of civil violence. Stringent economic conditions
exacerbate inter-group tensions and governmental resentments over scarce employment
opportunities. Indeed, Kaufman (1996) has argued that one cannot motivate economically
satisfied people to rebel. Logically, as state resources become scarce, the threat of ethno
political violence is more probable. Further, we might expect governments to enact more
discriminatory policies during economic down cycles as individuals within government seek to
secure constricting resources for their own identity group. As a result, the policy-to-violence
linkage will also be analyzed in relation to India’s economic fluctuations.
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Research Methodology
Ethno political violence among groups and by and against the government constitutes the
dependent variable in this study. Incidents of civil violence as well as various discriminatory
policy changes in India were culled from US State Department country reports, as well as from
the Political Handbook of the World, and Keesing’s Contemporary Archives Online. We chose
to combine sources in order to reduce single source bias in scholarship and media reports and to
maximize reported events through triangulation. However, we recognize that these all three are
Western sources and as such potentially might miss or distort the extent or subtext of Asian
events. However, Keesing’s, the source that produced the largest number of accounts, has
through the years tended to specialize in Afro-Asian politics, and presents unusually detailed and
thorough reports.14
Our data collection approach involved searching sources for any incident of ethnically
related economic, social or political policy change and/or incidents of political violence within
the state; thus the units of analysis for this study entail event sequences. Once identified, the
sequence of events surrounding the episode of violence or policy change (or both if they
occurred as predicted) was coded. For comparative purposes, we also coded sequence of events
surrounding mass-based political protest. For example, if a report in Keesing’s relayed the
information that violent riots had occurred as a result of protests showing opposition to a
recently enacted language law, the sequence coded would be a discriminatory policy change
followed by protest and ethno political violence. As one can imagine, there are many event
sequence possibilities in such a project. These possibilities include cases where a discriminatory
policy change did not involve violence, where ethno political violence occurred without policy
change, as well as cases where the two occurred in sequence. 15
Reports surrounding such events for three months time were then coded to reveal
sequences whereby policy initiatives, protests, and violence either did or did not follow each
other.16 Thus it was possible to specify policies that were preceded or followed by protest or
rebellion or state repression and those that were not. Likewise we identified acts of protest or
violence (e.g., assassinations or hate crimes) that were or were not related to ethnic policy
moves. If ethno-cultural violence or protest were not preceded by a detectable policy move, the
case would be coded as ‘no political event’ followed by identity-based violence in the form of
riot, etc. Thus we were able to specify violence that did not appear to stem from governmental
policy moves as well as that which did. The goal of such coding methods is to eliminate
spurious coding association. Admittedly, the sequence determinations are based upon second
hand reports typically from journalists in the field. Such reports may be subject to bias or
misinformation. It can be argued, however, that the benefit of the closer association coding
mechanisms employed here outweigh the threat of bias or misinformation.
Record was made of all reported mass-based acts of civil violence, identity-based policy
changes, and political protests, organized strikes, or demonstrations between the period 1947 and
2000. We also recorded major economic crises or downturns as a contextual variable when
noted in the sources identified above. In dealing with violence, we were not concerned with any
particular casualty threshold, but rather with violent reaction or outbursts that could entail riots,
bombings, armed attacks, acts of terrorism, etc.
The label “discriminatory” is used if a policy, regulation, or official governmental act
affects ethno-cultural status, as in language, religion, culture and culturally-based political rights,
economic and resource allocations. Thus measures regarding the status of language, religion,
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citizenship, employment, political participation and cultural/regional autonomy can be
considered as positively or negatively discriminating. As noted we coded for proposed as well
as implemented policies. For heuristic purposes, then, a national policy that declared Hindi the
state language would be coded negatively (i.e. from the viewpoint of the minority). On the other
hand, a policy that provided autonomy for a certain minority group, or which allowed for
multiple language use would, in most circumstances, be coded positively. Both, however, are
examples of discriminatory policy changes and could result in violence, either by the
disadvantaged minority or by the embittered or insecure majority or by the government.
Therefore, we will analyze cases where either negative or positive policy changes, or both, might
have set off violence.17
Coding episodes of violence in India over more than 50 years is challenging. For
example, violence of a certain type can recur several times. Certain regions of the country, such
as Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast, also can be viewed as having episodes of violence
repeatedly and nearly continuously for years at a time. In such cases, the outbreak of violence or
a renewed outbreak after a lull was considered a new event to be coded. On the other hand,
ongoing or repeated battles in these areas were not coded as separate new events.18 Finally, as
noted, we recorded cases with non-violent outcomes if we found a prior ethno-political policy or
protest. We assume that any other non-violence outcome, say following no policy moves, is not
pertinent to this study.
Contextual variables included in the study are executive leadership change and economic
fluctuation. Executive leadership change is considered to have occurred when there was a
change in the position of prime minister. This information is available through the Indian
Embassy at www.indiaembassy.org. In order to assess the proposed policy-to-violence
relationship and leadership change, a series of figures are utilized identifying when
discriminatory policies occurred in relation to leadership change. In order to identify a possible
connection between party shift and the policy-to-violence linkage, the figures included below
also make the distinction between a party shift versus a prime minister shift when they are
different.
Economic fluctuation is analyzed in a similar fashion. In order to effectively identify the
ups and downs of India’s economy, we measure percent change in gross domestic product from
previous year. These figures are derived from International Financial Statistics.19 This variable
is analyzed with the more reliable policy change data for the years 1960-2000.
Findings
Project data collection resulted in 200 cases of significant political events (or related
events in a series) or episodes of violence.20 During the 1947-2000 period, we found 79
instances (outbreaks or renewals) of ethno political violence in India, where violence came
either as the first incident or as a direct result (specified or indicated in the accounts) of a
policy or a single precipitating event. We found an additional 25 cases where violence came as
the end result of a long chain of events, including ethnic policies or protests, constituting what
we called “subsequent violence.” Twenty of these latter cases were identity-based violence,
and five were non-identity based.
Contrary to the study’s basic hypothesis of a firm link between discriminatory policy
moves and violence, of the 79 original violent incidents, 48 (61%) were preceded by ‘no
event,’ meaning they could be associated directly with no particular policy change or political

Vol. 10, No.2

Peace & Conflict Studies

Olson Lounsbery & Pearson

32

event, ethnic or not. Many of these seemingly spontaneous incidents appeared to be related to
general patterns of violence within the country. For example, there were several entries related
to Hindu-Muslim fighting that might have originated because of friction in the streets or over
issues such as disrespect of religious holy places (especially mosques). Another source of such
episodes dealt with violence against lower social group or caste members, particularly the
Harijans or Untouchables.
In some instances such vengeful fighting or communal attacks could have related to
prior objectionable policies. Some disputes regarding the use or building of religious
institutions, for example, could relate to older prevailing governmental policies and regulations
or to the lack of policy reform, regulation, or enforcement to protect the religious community’s
interests. However, if we could not identify a specific proximate policy initiative, we did not
code for the relevance of such older policies and practices or for policy failures or omissions.
Of the 31 initial identity-based violent incidents preceded by detectable policy moves,
only eight (26%) were preceded by discriminatory policy changes, either positive or negative.
An additional three events of ethno political violence were preceded by proposed
discriminatory policies that were not yet adopted. Thus, in all less than 40% of original violent
mass based incidents had discriminatory policy antecedents. Interestingly, nine (29%) of the
identity-based violence episodes were first protests or demonstrations that then became violent,
so that protests seemed about as likely as policy changes to lead to or warn of violence.
Obviously, factors such as police responses to such demonstrations can affect the turn to
violence. Various other events, such as a reported arrest, death or assassination, as well as
migration patterns preceded the remainder of initial violent incidents.
Looking at the 25 cases of “subsequent violence,” i.e., violence coming after a longer
sequence of events, we found that eight (32%) were preceded by some form of identity policy
initiative (whether positive, negative, or “neutral”). Nine resulted from prior governmental
repression, while 11 (44%) were preceded by some form of identity protest. Of course since
these are sequences, a given act of violence could have been related to a combination of the
above factors. The most common such sequence (four cases) was for discriminatory policy to
lead to subsequent protest and then to violent outbreaks.
Thus, on the whole and looked at from the standpoint of violence, discriminatory policy
changes preceded the outbreaks in only about one third to two-fifths of the cases. Looked at
from the standpoint of discriminatory policy, however, there was a higher frequency of
subsequent violence. In all there were 40 cases of discriminatory policy in the data, both
negative and positive (one case neutral) in India during the years under study. Interestingly and
perhaps indicating India’s democratic tendencies, the majority of those cases were of the
positive variety (28 cases or 70%). It seems apparent that the Indian national or state
governments have repeatedly attempted to alleviate identity-based tension via various sorts of
positive discriminatory policies or reforms. For example, there were many examples of
devolution, such as providing full statehood for Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and
Meghalaya in 1970, as well as examples of policy designed to recognize languages other than
Hindi at the state level.
Recall our assumption that positive discrimination will have more salutary effects on
violence than negative discrimination. Of the 28 cases of positive discriminatory policy, the
majority (17 or 61%) was not followed by violence or protest. Positive discrimination led to
identity-based protest in eight cases (29%) and to identity violence in only three instances
(11%). In three more cases a sequence beginning with positive discrimination led through
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several subsequent events to violence. However, as seen in Table 1, the fact then that some
40% of the time angry mass response appears likely even after “positive” policy reforms should
give decision-makers pause.
Table 1
Positive Discriminatory Policy Change
28 of 40 (70%) discriminatory policy changes were positive in nature
8 of 28 (29%) positive policies were followed by identity-based protest
3 of 28 (11%) positive policies were followed by ethno political violence
Negative policy discrimination had somewhat more destabilizing effects. Twelve of the
discriminatory policies were coded as negative,21 and unlike positive discrimination nearly twothirds of these instances were followed either by ethno political violence or political protest.
Indeed violence occurred in five instances (42%) with protest coming in three more (25%) cases.
Thus violence was a relatively more frequent outcome for negative than for positive
discrimination. While a variety of factors might contribute to ethno political violence, it seems
clear (Table 2) that when negative policy discrimination does occur, it tends to be followed
rather predictably (two-thirds of the Indian cases) by violence and/or protest. Indeed the violent
effects were rather immediate in the case of negative discrimination, not going through long
sequences or chains of events.
Table 2
Negative Discriminatory Policy Change
12 of 40 (30%) discriminatory policies were negative in nature
3 of 12 (25%) of negative policies were followed by identity-based protest
5 of 12 (42%) of negative policies were followed by ethno political violence
Several conflicts theorists (Sisk, 1996; Horowitz, 1985) have discussed the
possibility of devolution and federalism as a means of effectively dealing with such
heterogeneous societies as India. The fact that India has made serious efforts to localize
government for that reason, and yet still experienced high levels of identity-based violence raises
questions about the assumed benefits of devolution, or about whether the correct policies were
engaged. Devolution generally would be considered positive in our categorization, and as such
perhaps did not often lead directly to violence, but it also did not preclude violence arising from
negative policies in the realm. Even when the national government provided local control and
went through the pains of creating separate linguistic states, such as those in the Punjab
Reorganization Bill of 1966, violence continued to be seen (e.g., in Punjab and New Delhi). It
seems that devolutionary policies can have the effect of creating “minorities within minorities”
or even generating majorities who perhaps do not see the need to accommodate yet another
linguistic community. Yet in other circumstances, the subdivision of states into still smaller
autonomous units might well relieve some of these tensions.
Further research is, therefore, needed focusing specifically on the benefits and drawbacks
of devolution, decentralization, of power sharing in diverse populations. Although positive
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discriminatory policies did in some cases lead to violence, they appeared to do so less frequently
than their negative counterparts. There were eight cases of proposed discriminatory policies,
with seven of them of the ‘positive’ variety. Five of the eight (63%) resulted in eventual
violence and an additional two in identity-based protest. Proposed events thus appear to be even
more volatile than their enacted counterparts, perhaps because groups become alarmed and take
the occasion to campaign against adoption through violent means.
On four occasions discriminatory policy actually followed rather than preceded violence
or protest. For example, in Assam, 1960 linguistic riots led to a decision to make Assamese the
official language of the state. In two other instances previously objectionable policy was
reversed after protests. This type of sequence, however, was less prevalent than one might have
assumed, and therefore indicates that the relationship between policy and violence tends to be
uni-directional, i.e., to lead from policy to violence or protest. Indian authorities may have
proven less responsive in policy terms to popular outcry or uprising than democratic theory
might predict. Over time and given repeated incidents of communal violence, local or national
governments might revert to old “learned” responses, might become less open to reform, or
might adopt new approaches to policing or enforcement.
We must note that “governmental policy” in India implies either national or regional
(state) policies. We might wonder whether one or the other is more prone to produce violent
reaction or opposition, especially in light of the devolution hypothesis. Therefore, we separated
out our discriminatory policies according to their regional content, listing regionally based
policies, national policies with regional content, and national policies.22 In Table 3 we show
quite clearly that regionally oriented identity policies, whether passed by states or national
authorities, are more likely to generate violence than are national policies. It could be that such
regional policies are meant to deal with more intractable difficulties and more entrenched
violence to begin with, and therefore are more violence prone, or that they are in and of
themselves more controversial and threatening to minorities. Further study of this question will
be required.
Table 3
Sources and Focus of Discriminatory Policies
Total

Led to
Violence
7
2

Regional Policies
17
National Policies with
10
Regional Content
National Policies
16
1
Chi-square = 15.50, significant < .01

Led to
Protest
3
3
6

During the data collection and analysis it became apparent that language policy has been
a volatile issue in Indian history, but our hypothesis was that it would not be the most volatile of
the policy domains. There were 27 event sequences having to do with language issues, including
12 linguistic discriminatory policy changes and five proposed discriminatory policy changes. Of
those policies enacted (Table 4), 10 were positive in nature with seven of those followed by
ethno political violence and an additional three by identity-based protest. This illustrates the
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numerous governmental attempts in India to give representation to the many linguistic groups
within the country, and the fact that positive policy changes produced markedly less linguistic
violence than proposed or negative changes. In fact, there were only two cases of negative
linguistic policy with both experiencing ethno political violence in their aftermath. Further,
there were five proposed linguistic policies with three followed by violence.
Table 4
Linguistic Discriminatory Policy Change

Followed by ethno
political violence
Total DPC

Positive
Linguistic DPC
4
(40%)
10

Negative
Linguistic DPC
2
(100%)
2

Proposed
Linguistic DPC
3
(60%)
5

By comparison, there were seven cases of religious discriminatory policy changes
(three negative and four positive in nature). Only two cases (one negative) were followed by
ethno political violence, and another two (one negative) by protest. Surprisingly not only are
religious policies apparently less frequent in India, but they are also seemingly less volatile
than their linguistic counterparts.
The majority of the identity-based policies identified in the study were considered
economic and/or political in nature (although there was some overlap where a particular policy
might be considered both economic/political and either linguistic or religious if the policy
legislated several benefits). There were a total of 30 economic/political discriminatory
policies. Of those, 22 were positive in nature. These policies were the least volatile (Table 5),
with only three leading to ethno political violence and five leading to protest. On the other
hand, four of seven negative economic/political policies were followed by ethno political
violence. An additional negative economic/political policy was followed by protest.
Table 5
Economic/Political Discriminatory Policies

Followed by ethno
political violence
Followed by
protest
Total DPC

Positive
Economic/Political
DPC
3
(13.6%)
5
(22.7%)
22

Negative
Economic/Political
DPC
4
(57%)
1
(14%)
7
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All discriminatory policy types, and particularly the “negative” ones, have been shown to
result in ethno political violence at least some of the time. On the other hand, despite our initial
expectations for India, linguistic policies appear more volatile than their religious or
economic/political counterparts.
It has been hypothesized that resource disparities play a significant role in accelerating
ethno political conflict. When focusing on discriminatory policy changes, this variable seems
theoretically relevant. When resources are scarce, identity groups may feel the need to secure
them for their group more so than when the economy is prosperous and healthy. Data collection
indicates 12 cases of events considered to entail economic downturns as reported by project
sources. Four (33%) of those were related to non-identity protest—for example, the left-wing
trade union strike in 1967 protesting rising prices and unemployment—and three (25%) were
related to non-identity violence (i.e. food riots). Some cases of ethno political violence occurred
during the same year as these economic declines, however we were unable to establish direct
relations between the two event types.23 These findings do not, however, provide a systematic
analysis of the relationship between economic fluctuation and the policy change-to-violence
linkage as proposed earlier.
In order to better make this assessment, Figure 1 is presented for the years after 1960, and
identifies policy changes that were and were not followed by ethno political violence. These
changes were graphed in relation to percent change in GDP from previous year (the first year
had no reference point). In addition, the graph also indicates these changes and economic cycles
in relation to party and prime minister shifts.
Figure 1
Leadership Change, Economic Fluctuation, and Discriminatory Policies
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Intriguingly, incidents of discriminatory policy change (DPC) which were followed by
violence seemed to come at relatively extreme points of economic change, i.e., either upward
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economic shifts of over four percent, or downward shifts. However, contrary to expectations,
the upward shifts appeared more subject to such policy linkage to violent outbreaks than the
downward shifts were (note that violence occurred in India nearly every year, so that the
indicators are for the policy-violence sequence, and not for all occurrences of violence). All
instances of policy change NOT followed by violence during this period also occurred in the
better economic times, with some of the non-violent outcomes coming coincidentally in the same
year as the violent ones. Overall, then, one is hard pressed to conclude that economics made
much difference. Bad economic times did seem, however, to correspond to the possibility of
violence following discriminatory moves, and not to the policy-non-violent outcomes.
As for political changes, the first two prime ministerial changes and the first party shift
were followed rather closely by ethno political policies and subsequent violence. However, this
pattern was not as clear for later governmental shifts, either of party or leadership, and it could
have been that in the early years the nation’s first ethno political policies were being enunciated
and coincidentally that prime ministers finally changed (after the long Nehru reign). During the
more conservative shift of the 1980s and 1990s, there may indeed have been a great deal of
“ethnic politics” going in, especially with Hindu nationalist revival. Yet these evidently did not
necessarily translate predictably into policy moves followed by near term violence. Fears of
ethnic repression or intimidation, however, might have led to an atmosphere leading to
communal fighting, whether associated with specific policies or not.
Implications
It seems clear that discriminatory policy changes in India are not the only source or
trigger of ethno political violence. In fact, the majority of such violent acts seem to occur
rather spontaneously as the result of a street-level disagreement in a pattern of continuing
conflict and vengeance. Future research is required to shed light on these episodes to assist in
reducing the tension and atmosphere that makes spontaneous violence possible. We also have
not distinguished between ethnic violence directed at other groups and at the state, so that we
would want to know more about what triggers one form versus the other.
It is also clear, however, that discriminatory policies, when they do occur, often lead to
violence or identity-based protest, with negative discriminatory and proposed policies proving
considerably more volatile than the positive variety, although opposition to positive policies,
particularly from groups which stand to lose some of their previous advantages or status, can
become violent as well. The potential of violent outbreaks as a result of discriminatory policy
seems to be related to the focus and location of that policy. India’s attempts to strike a balance
with some devolved ethno-related powers and a still strong central government seem to have
created a system in which regional discriminatory policies are more likely to lead to violence
than those adopted at the national level.
Future research comparing Indian policy with other more or less centralized countries
might provide useful insight into this issue and the adequacy of the balance. We have only
been able to highlight what appears to be an interesting difference in central and regional
policy effects. Indian democracy has generated a distinctive and somewhat successful pattern
of positive policy initiatives to deal with the challenges of heterogeneity. Indeed Das Gupta
(1988, p.165) argues cogently from the Assamese example that ethnic struggles are frequently
over who will control the country’s resources and that given enlightened policies at the center
“ethnic regionalism and secular nationalism are not necessarily competing values.”
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Project results illustrate the problematic nature of dealing with a diverse
linguistic population via linguistic policy, especially in comparison to religious discrimination
per se. Such policies and demands often are associated with violence, indicating the sensitive
nature of language and the importance of language recognition. Again, cross-country
comparative analyses are necessary to explore methods of appeasing several linguistic groups
without the problem of creating a “within minority.”
If discriminatory policy is a catalyst of violence, it is evidently not as
intertwined with other factors as one might have assumed. For example, one factor commonly
linked to ethnic violence, economic downturns, seemed at least as likely to be related to nonidentity based policies, demonstrations, and violence. The sequences whereby discriminatory
policy led to violence, at least in our data, generally were not very long, with the most common
sequence being policy leading to protest leading to violence. However, negative policy per se
seemed quite capable of directly generating violent uprisings. Therefore, such policy, whether
proposed or implemented, bears watching by those interested in early warning or amelioration
of ethnic violence. Again, one would want to see the patterns in other states, but India affords
an important initial validation, especially as regards the incendiary potential of linguistic
policies.
Endnotes
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1

We use the term “ethnic” or “ethnopolitical” conflict and violence in this paper to denote
fighting over issues related to cultural identity. This can encompass disputes regarding group
identity, nationalism, language, religion, citizenship and other aspects of culture such as myths,
traditions, and norms. It overlaps with but is treated as distinct from disputes over other issues
such as ideology, territorial control and power that might not have an ethnicity component.
2
The idea of relative deprivation, translated from the individual to the group level, is seen as a
discrepancy between a group’s value expectations and what the group is actually able to achieve.
3
Factors in a group’s capacity for sustained collective action are the strength of the group’s
identity and group mobilization. Factors affording a group the opportunity to initiate
ethnopolitical rebellion include recent major changes in the structure of the political regime and
support from kindred groups in neighboring countries. Where Gurr focuses on the interaction of
many structural and institutional factors in assessing risk of internal civil conflict and
Stavenhagen looks at the nation-state system, Stuart J. Kaufman (1996) argues that hostile
masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas drive internal ethnic warfare.
“They reinforce each other in a spiral of increasing conflict: belligerent leaders stoke mass
hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders; and both together threaten other groups,
creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership
belligerence” (Kaufman, 1996: 109). Kaufman also makes a distinction between wars initiated
by dominant groups, which he terms ‘popular chauvinism’ (mass-led) and ‘government
jingoism’ (elite-led), and those initiated by subordinate groups, or ‘mass insurgencies’ (massled) and ‘elite conspiracy’ (elite-led).
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While they may pose challenges for multi-ethnic states, Barnett and other scholars of India
note that separatist movements need not be incompatible with national integration, providing
that integration is not seen as synonymous with homogenization and that cultural pluralism is
genuinely accepted (Brass, 1981, p. 452).
5
One area of inter-ethnic coexistence in the religious domain is the general Indian pattern of
tolerance in return for acceding to the basically Hindu social order. Hindus have come to
expect this in relation to the ancient absorption of Buddhism, and it created difficulties relative
to the Sikhs in the 1980s (Mahmood, 1989).
6
Horowitz (1985) and Kaufman (1996) join scholars such as Merton (1957) and Gagnon
(1995) in enunciating what has been termed the “instrumentalist” view of civil violence, in
which national elites are seen to exploit group antagonisms for concrete political or territorial
gains. An alternative conception is the so called “primordialist” view that most ethnopolitical
conflicts are rooted either in human nature as deep-seated tribal hatreds (Huntington, 1996) or
long evolving cultural suspicions and rivalries. For example, Barber (1995) argues that
“tribes” who are at war with each other are trying to redraw boundaries in order to further
divide the international system. Despite assumptions about tribal hatreds, however, ethnic
differences appear to play a relatively small role in the onset and resolution of violent
international disputes (Huth, 1995). Singer (1993) has begun to explore the validity of the
primordialist view on intrastate conflict, and finds that “cultural difference does not necessitate
conflict; rather, it only makes it easier for elites to move their societies closer to hostility and
rivalry” (Henderson, 1997). Singer (1996) also argues that to dismiss these intrastate conflicts
as tribal hatreds is dangerous if not patronizing, and prematurely assumes that we already know
what the conflicts are about. Such conflicts are complex processes about real issues that need
further analysis, as seen in Subrate K. Mitra’s (1995) critique of Asghar Engineer’s (1994)
thesis that “ethnicity derives its strength from primordial identity,” while in India Muslims
have made relatively successful political alliances with former Hindu untouchables. By
contrast, Dutt’s (1976) instrumentalist and pro-Congress analysis of the Indian constitutional
crisis blamed political and opposition agitators for combining anti-democratic themes with
ethnic hatred to gain power for themselves and bring down both the government and
democratic structures.
7
The added dimension of economic dislocation and modernization as well as class-based
politics inevitably comes into discussions of ethnic or identity conflict. Based on case studies
in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, Horowitz (1985) generates a theory of group entitlement
and inter-group comparison, arguing that differential modernization based on ethnicity is an
important factor for understanding the collective psychology of identity conflicts. He argues
that the “modernization gap” and elite ambitions taking advantage of accompanying
psychological tensions have resulted in post-colonial states where elites have the ability to turn
group fears and resentment into mass antagonism and war. Modernization theory entails the
belief that ethnic groups modernize at differential rates, and as a result, there is inter-group
competition for benefits. The uneven distribution of economic and educational resources,
according to Horowitz, is an important source of group tensions. One might also speculate that
economic hardships, and their differential effects on various dominant or subordinate groups,
can hasten the resort to force.
8
Indeed one type of institutional arrangement militating against inter-ethnic violence might be
the form of “civic engagement” in crosscutting associations and groups that tend to break down
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polarization. This has been seen among Hindu’s and Muslims in cities where violence has
been minimized or abated (Varshney, 2001, noting that most Indian civil violence takes place
in cities rather than in India’s myriad of villages). However, there are conditions where these
consultative networks and associations might not suffice, as in the former Yugoslavia, either
because the associations are not prominent, large, and well enough organized or because they
are overtaken by events.
9
Citing a study by Oldenburg (1993) Manor notes that Indian communal (religious) incidents
peaked in the mid 1960s, and despite a general rise in the 1980s did not approach those levels
again up to 1990. Others have noted a marked increase again in the 1990s, however.
10
Indeed Basu and Kohli note the irony that this trend has coincided with the
“deinstitutionalization” of the Indian state, i.e., the fall of previous pillars such as secularism,
socialism, and Congress Party democracy and the deterioration of civil and political
bureaucracies. The electorate has multiplied and competition over resources distributed by the
state has intensified along with inter-party competition and grassroots democracy. They further
note that state policy can be either direct and intended or indirect and unintended in its impact
on subsequent protest and violence. Indeed state inaction in key situations can also be a form
of policy by default.
11
These authors also note (pp. 323-324) that ethno cultural identities themselves change and
transform over time, especially as transformed into political movements that wax and wane.
Again the role of the state and political leaders is considered crucial in negotiating such
changes.
12
We presume that although mere proposals for adoption might also spark violence, crowds
and groups react more vehemently to actual regulations in place than to plans and proposals,
since discussion of various approaches is always taking place and policy does not become
really “serious” until it is approved and on the way to implementation.
13
In cases where there is a complete state breakdown, where no policies could be made,
presumably the discriminatory policy change could have occurred prior to the breakdown and
may have served as a catalyst to that fact.
14
Since Keesings Contemporary Archives Online was only available from 1960-2000, for the
earlier years we supplemented the data with the Political Handbook of the World (1998).
However, since the latter is not as comprehensive as Keesings, the findings before 1960 must
be treated as reliable but less authoritative than for the 1960-2000 period. Separate analyses
were completed for the latter period for comparison with the entire period, 1947-2000, but the
findings did not change substantially.
15
While one would also want to account for the outcome “no policy reform-no violence” the
event data approach we utilize at present does not afford that as a practical measurement since
those are essentially “non-events.” One could alternatively deal with “country or event years”
and code zeros for years with no such activity, but the effort here was to go to the event level
itself in order to see sequences by which action and reaction in the policy-violence nexus
actually occur. At the initial stage of investigation it is important to look closely at these
sequences in order to induce theoretical propositions for further systematic testing.
16
If outcomes and effects were noted beyond three months, and were clearly related in the
account to policy initiatives, they were coded as well.
17
Obviously groups can interpret a policy in widely contrasting ways, and a certain subjectivity
is inherent in such coding. Language laws may validate one community and invalidate its
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neighbors; U.S. affirmative action is seen as just in some quarters and discriminatory in others.
However we treated such policies as negative if their effects were highly unbalanced or
unfavorable to minorities.
18
The reasoning for such a decision is two-fold: first, reports of specific violent regional
episodes tend to be sporadic and rarely detailed (for example, a report of ‘continued violence in
Kashmir’ provides very little insight into the level of violence or its circumstances), and
secondly, the project is concerned with identifying potential causes of violent outbreaks (hence
its potential usefulness in “early warning”) as opposed to continuous episodes. As a result,
initial and renewed (after a distinct lull of at least a year in reports) instances of violence were
the focus of data collection. There is one particular exception. Hindu/Muslim communal
violence is a recurring Indian problem, and can take a number of forms. The difficulty in
identifying this violence as ‘continual’ is that it rarely occurs only in a specific region, so that
one does not know whether reports of violence in various regions is part of a single conflict or
indicative of several conflicts. Therefore, if we did not know enough about the particular
circumstances to say it was or was not a continuation of prior local fighting, this type of
violence was coded as a new event whenever it was reported.
19
Volume 2001 was used to identify percent change in GDP from previous year for the years
1971-2000. Volume 1971 was used for the years 1960-1970.
20
Data analyzed in the study are available by contacting the authors.
21
An example of such a policy was the 1965 Official Language Bill, replacing English as the
official language in India with Hindi. Although the bill also required regulation to ensure that
the change would not cause any hardship to those who did not speak Hindi, the action
nonetheless sparked a series of riots in several Indian states by those opposed to the bill who
viewed it as a threat, as well as those who supported the bill and viewed its opponents as a
threat.
22
Due to the nature of the reports used for coding, it was not always possible to determine
whether a policy was passed by the state or national government, but it was possible to
determine whether it applied locally or nationally. We assume that many of the local policy
moves were passed by state authorities, and we were further able to distinguish clear national
policies that affected only a state (such as the Bombay reorganization bill of 1960 which
created two separate states). Thus, our analysis distinguishes local from national policy.
23
A second analysis was completed using Gross National Product (GNP) as the economic
indicator for the years 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. These were compared to
the outbreak of violence grouped in
References
Bangura, Yusuf. 1994. “The Search for Identity: Ethnicity, Religion and Political Violence.”
Occasional Paper No. 6. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development,
Geneva.
Barber, Benjamin R. 1995. Jihad Vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books.
Barnett, Marguerite R. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Basu, Amrita and Atul Kohli. 1997. “Introduction Community Conflicts and the State in India.”
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 320-324.

Vol. 10, No.2

Peace & Conflict Studies

Olson Lounsbery & Pearson

42

Bostock, William. 1997. “Language Grief: A ‘Raw Material’ of Ethnic Conflict.” Nationalism
and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 94-112.
Brass, Paul R. 1981. “Class, Ethnic Group, and Party in Indian Politics.” World Politics, Vol. 33,
No. 3, pp. 449-467.
Cashman, Greg. 1993. What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International
Conflict. New York: Lexington Books.
Center for Comparative Political Research of the State University of New York. 1998. Political
Handbook of the World. New York: State University of New York Press.
Das Gupta, Jyotirindra. 1988. “Ethnicity, Democracy, and Development.” In Atul Kohli, ed.,
India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Dougherty, James E. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 1990. Contending Theories of International
Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Dutt, V.P. 1976. “The Emergency in India: Background and Rationale.” Asian Survey, Vol. 16,
No. 12, pp. 1124-1138.
Elazar, Daniel J. 2001. “Language and Federalism: The Multi-ethnic Challenge.” UNESCO.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Ellingsen, Tanja. 2000. “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and
Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.
44, No. 2, pp. 228-249.
Engineer, Asghar. 1994. Lifting the Veil: Communal Violence and Communal Harmony in
Contemporary India. London: Sangam.
Esman, Milton J. and Ronald J. Herring, eds., 2001. Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict:
Rethinking Development Assistance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Gagnon, V. 1995. “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict.” In S. Lynn-Jones and S.
Miller, eds., Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts.
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1996. “A Risk Assessment Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion: Applied to
Asian Minorities in the late 1990s.” Paper presented at the Workshop on Crisis and
Conflict Early Warning Systems, 14 November-16 November, CIDCM, University of
Maryland
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1997. Polity IV Project Data: Political Regime Characteristics and
Transitions, 1800-2000. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/.
Gurr, Ted Robert and Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore. 1989. Polity II Handbook. Boulder,
CO: University of Colorado.
Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff. 1994. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Haas, Michael. 1968. “Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900-1960.” In J. David
Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics. New York: Free Press.
Harff, Barbara. 1996. “Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises: Sequential Models and the Role
of Accelerators.” Chapter prepared for the proceedings of the Workshop on Risk

43

Peace & Conflict Studies

Olson Lounsbery & Pearson

Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, 14 November-16 November, CIDCM,
University of Maryland.
Hasan, Zoya. Ed. 1994. Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and the State in India.
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Haynes, Jeff. 1995. “Religion, Fundamentalism and Ethnicity: A Global Perspective.”
Discussion Paper. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva.
Hegre, Havard, Tanja Ellingsen, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Scott Gates. 2001. “Towards a
Democratic Civil Peace? Opportunity, Grievance and Civil War 1816-1992.” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 33-48.
Henderson, Errol A. 1999. “Civil Wars.” In Lawrence Kurtz, ed., The Encyclopedia of
Violence, Peace and Conflict. San Diego: Academic Press.
Henderson, Errol A. 1997. “Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and
the Onset of War, 1820-1989.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 5, pp. 649668.
Henderson, Errol A. and J. David Singer. 2000. “Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 194692.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 275-299.
Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Huntington, Samuel. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Simon and Schuster.
Huth, Paul. 1995. Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Joshi, Barbara R. 1982. “Whose Law, Whose Order: ‘Untouchables,’ Social Violence, and the
State in India.” Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 7, pp. 676-687.
Kaufman, Stuart J. 1996. “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s
Civil War.” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 108-138.
Keesing’s Worldwide. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives On-Line. London: Keesing’s Limited.
www.keesings.com.
Kohli, Atul. 1997. “Can Democracies Accommodate Ethnic Nationalism? Rise and Decline of
Self-Determination Movements in India,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp.
325-344.
Kohli, Atul. 1990. Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Laitin, David D. 1993. “Migration and Language Shift in Urban India.” International Journal of
the Sociology of Language, Vol. 103, pp. 57-72.
Lake, David A. and Donald Rothchild. 1996. “Ethnic Fears and Global Engagement: The
International Spread and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” Policy Paper No.6, Institute
on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California.
Licklider, Roy. 1995. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 19451993.” American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 3, September, pp. 681-690.
Licklider, Roy. 1993. “How Civil Wars End: Questions and Methods.” In Roy Licklider, ed.,
Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End. New York: New York University Press.
Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley. 1989. “Sikh Rebellion and the Hindu Concept of Order.” Asian
Survey, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 326-340.
Manor, James. 1996. “‘Ethnicity’ and Politics in India.” International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3,
pp. 459-75.

Vol. 10, No.2

Peace & Conflict Studies

Olson Lounsbery & Pearson

44

Maoz, Zeev. 1989. “Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International
Conflict, 1816-1976.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 2, June, pp. 199231.
Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett. 1992. “Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political Stability: Is
the Lack of Conflict Among Democracies a Statistical Artifact?” International
Interactions, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 245-267.
Merton, Robert. 1957. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Midlarsky, Manus. 1989. Handbook of War Studies. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
Mitra, Subrata K. 2001. “Language and Federalism: The Multi-Ethnic Challenge.” UNESCO,
Oxford: Blackwell.
Mitra, Subrata K. 1995. “Lifting the Veil: Communal Violence and Communal Harmony in
Contemporary India; Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka.” Review article,
International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 429-430.
Oldenburg, P. 1993. “Assessing State Activity at the Grassroots in India.” Paper presented to the
Association of Asian Studies Conference, San Francisco.
Pandy, Gyanendra. 1990. The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Ross, Marc. 1993. The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspectives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. “Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 29-54.
Rothman, Jay. 1997. Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and
Communities. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass.
Rummel, Rudolph J. 1968. “The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign
Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations.” In J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative
International Politics. New York: Free Press.
Rupesinghe, Kumar. 1988. “Ethnic Conflicts in South Asia: The Case of Sri Lanka and the
Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF).” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp.
337-350.
Singer, J. David. 1996. “Armed Conflict in the Former Colonial Regions: From Classification
to Explanation.” In Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe, and Paul Sciarone, eds.,
Between Development and Destruction: An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in PostColonial States. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Singer, J. David. 1993. “Interests, Identities and Militarized Disputes.” Paper presented at the
Conference on Enduring Rivalries, March, Bloomington.
Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts.
Washington DC: United States Peace Institute.
Stavenhagen, Rodolpho. 1996. Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Tanter, Raymond. 1966. “Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 19581960.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 41-64.
United States Department of State.
1998.
US Country Reports: India.
www.state.gov/www/background_notes/india_998_bgn.html
Varshney, Ashutosh. 2001. “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society.” World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3,
pp. 362-398.

45

Peace & Conflict Studies

Olson Lounsbery & Pearson

Wallensteen, Peter and Margareta Sollenberg. 1999. “Armed conflict, 1989-98.” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 593-606.
Weiner, Myron. 1978. India at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1977.” Washington,
DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1972. “Models for the Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of States.”
In Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War and Numbers. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Williams, Robin M., Jr. 1994. The Sociology of Ethnic Conflicts: Comparative International
Perspectives
Zinnes, Dina and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1971. “An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of
Nations.” In W. Hanreider, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy. New York: David McKay.

Vol. 10, No. 2

Peace & Conflict Studies

Mac Ginty

46

THE PROSPECT OF MULTI-LEVEL VOTING IN POST-PEACE ACCORD
NORTHERN IRELAND

Roger Mac Ginty
Abstract
This article reviews the possibility of multi-level voting in Northern Ireland in the wake
of the 1998 peace accord. Post-peace accord elections can act as powerful indicators of
the fate of a peace. Using Reif and Schmitt’s framework of second-order elections, it
finds some evidence of varying electoral behaviour according to the electoral arena. The
article also uses original data from a major opinion survey to assess public attitudes
towards the suite of governing institutions with powers in or over a devolved Northern
Ireland. The evidence of multi-level voting is limited and does not extend to electors
abandoning ethnic voting patterns in the new political dispensation. In fact, it is argued
that the very nature of the peace process has encouraged a re-entrenchment of exclusive
nationalism and unionism.
Introduction
Northern Ireland’s 1998 Belfast Agreement saw the introduction of a new set of
governing institutions, including an elected powersharing assembly. The new political
configuration offered the possibility of changes in voting behaviour in a society
characterized by profound ethnonational fissures and entrenched ethnic voting patterns.
This article assesses if there has been any evidence of multi-level voting in Northern
Ireland in the wake of devolution from the United Kingdom. Multi-level voting, as
identified by Reif and Schmitt (1980), notes variations in electoral behaviour according
to electoral arena. In other words, the article considers if has devolution and the context
of a peace accord has caused significant changes in voting patterns in Northern Ireland.
Following a brief contextual overview of Northern Ireland’s peace process and
accord, the article considers the implications of elections in the aftermath of peace
accords in cases of ethnonational conflicts. Then, using Reif and Schmitt’s second-order
election model, the article examines trends in post-accord elections in Northern Ireland,
with particular reference to levels of participation and the development of new and small
political parties. A discussion of Northern Ireland’s voting patterns, as measured against
the second-order election model, then follows and is aided by material from the Northern
Ireland Life and Times survey of political attitudes. This material reinforces the
argument that Northern Ireland’s electors view the Northern Ireland Assembly (a
‘second-order’ institution) as first order. The wider question of the implications of
elections in post-accord peacebuilding is also revisited in the discussion section.
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The Northern Ireland peace process and accord
Briefly, the Northern Ireland conflict is between two sets of nationalism, broadly
fitting into the Protestant-unionist-loyalist bloc who favour continued maintenance of the
Union with the United Kingdom, and the pro-united Ireland Catholic-nationalistrepublican bloc (Whyte, 1991; O’Leary & McGarry, 1993). Both groups share the same
territory, and although the Northern Ireland state (founded in 1921) has always had a
Protestant majority, the Catholic minority has been of sufficient size to maintain
Protestant anxiety. The macro problems of the contested legitimacy of the state were
reflected at the issue level where policing, employment and social provision by the state
had a distinctly sectarian flavour. From the late 1960s onwards, nationalist discontent
developed into disorder and, eventually, political violence. A low level triangular
insurgency between the British state, loyalist and republican insurgents cost over 3,000
lives in the 1968-94 period (Fay, Morrissey & Smyth: 1999).
The peace process of the 1990s emerged from a classic ‘mutually hurting
stalemate’ (Zartman, 1989) in which the antagonists realised that unilateral action, by
themselves or others actors, would not be enough to bring major qualitative change to an
entrenched conflict. Of mutual interest was a lowering of the costs of the conflict. The
sovereign power in Northern Ireland, the British government, recognised from the mid1980s onwards that the Irish government (as proxy guardians of Northern Ireland’s
nationalist minority) should be involved in any concerted attempt to manage the conflict.
There followed the development of a remarkable British-Irish intergovernmental
relationship (Arthur, 2000). The two governments adopted the principle of inclusion
through which (violent) veto-holders with the potential to destabilise any agreement from
without were consciously included in peace talks. With the two governments acting as
custodians of a developing peace process, loyalist and republican militants felt confident
enough to call ceasefires and allow Northern Ireland’s political parties to investigate
proposals for the governance of Northern Ireland that would offer guarantees to the two
main communities. Intensive multi-party talks held in 1997-98 were not without drama
and interruption but an agreement was reached in April 1998 (Mac Ginty & Darby,
2002).
At 10,000 words, the Belfast Agreement was a complex document that confirmed
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status within the United Kingdom (Wilford, 2001; Bell,
2001; Horowitz, 2002). Northern Ireland’s constitutional status would be linked to
popular support, with both governments pledged to facilitate Irish unification if this was
the popular will. Three new institutions were established to deal with the complex set of
relationships that defined the Northern Ireland conflict. An Assembly with a
powersharing Executive would serve relationships in Northern Ireland. A North-South
Ministerial Council would allow for functional cooperation between the Irish government
and the Northern Ireland Executive on selected matters. A British-Irish Council would
provide a forum for cooperation between representatives from elected institutions across
the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Alongside the new institutional architecture, the
Agreement made provision for the early release of prisoners from militant groups, reform
of the police force and criminal justice system, and the establishment of bodies with
oversight on equality and human rights (Bell, 2001). In short, the Agreement ushered in
an advanced form of consociational government that aimed to defer constitutional issues
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and allow the development of cooperative relationships on the day-to-day governance of
Northern Ireland.
Post-peace accord elections
Elections in the aftermath of a peace accord have the capacity to act as powerful
indicators of the ‘state of the peace’ (Reilly, 2001; Reilly & Reynolds, 1999; Sisk &
Reynolds, 1998). This can operate in a direct sense through an election (often a
referendum) on a peace agreement. Similarly, support for moderate or extremist
candidates or parties standing in local, regional or national elections may be gauged as a
reinforcement or threat to post-accord peacebuilding. But elections can also act as
indirect indicators, pointing to more subjective, and highly political concepts of
moderation, respect for constitutional due process, and acceptance of diversity.
Electoral processes can have incredible importance in awarding or stripping peace
accords and political dispensations established under them with popular legitimacy. The
very staging of an election, the manner in which the election is run, the nature of the
political parties and candidates, the issues that dominate the campaign, and the size and
variety of parties can all have profound implications for the post-accord transition. To go
through these in more detail, the holding of an election suggests capability and
administrative competence, proficiencies not guaranteed in post-accord polities in which
census data, if in existence, may be unreliable due to selective counting or enforced
population shifts. Moreover, the holding of an election – by definition a major public
event – may provide an opportunity to draw a line in the sand or to publicly mark the
transition from conflict to ‘peace’. The manner in which the election is run may also be
indicative of the post-accord peacebuilding phase of a peace process. Whether the
campaign is marked by violence or intimidation, or the need for external guarantors in
the form of peacekeepers or election monitors, may reflect the extent to which key
principles underlying a peace accord have been internalised. Respect for the outcome of
the election, particularly among majorities and powerholders, will be a crucial portent for
the post-accord period.
The nature and composition of political parties is also important, with a number
of post-accord locations witnessing the almost overnight metamorphosis of militant
groups into political parties. The development of political parties along this model may
be a sign that politics will retrench rather than break from ethnic fissures. The issues that
dominate post-accord election campaigns can be important in signalling the ‘health’ of
the transition. This is particularly the case with regard to elections after the initial peace
accord period. The extent to which the issue agenda has remained focused on ethnic and
conflict related issues, as opposed to more functional public policy issues, may indicate
the degree to which a conflict is still alive and resistant to peacebuilding initiatives
(Reilly, 2003).
The variety of political parties able to contest the post-accord elections may also
inform observers about the nature of the post-accord political environment. A wide range
of parties may not necessarily indicate political pluralism or tolerance from centres of
authority. Instead, it may be a function of the type of electoral system, the fragmentation
of ethno-political blocs, and political geography.
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The timing of post-accord elections has attracted due attention, with critics
pointing to the dangers of premature elections and how they are often held at the behest
of the international community and are staged before the development of a broad-based
‘democratic infrastructure’. Of equal importance in terms of timing, is the staging of
elections subsequent to the initial post-accord election. In a number of post-accord
societies parliamentary or presidential elections have been deferred or replaced by ‘back
me or sack me’ referendums staged by the incumbent. A peaceful transition from the first
post-accord leadership to its successor leadership can be taken as a sign of the
institutionalisation of the post-accord political dispensation.
The fundamental issue is whether post-accord elections are short-term events or
part of long-term processes. Elections have the capacity to have ‘an ambiguous
relationship’ to democracy, inflaming the conflict and retarding long-term
democratisation (Lyon, 2002: 217). International ‘best practice’ during the 1990s saw an
emphasis on the quantification of democracy through electoral processes. The symbolic
content of post-accord elections is high (Mac Ginty, 2001: 1-21), but the ability of a
democratic political cultural to become embedded in the society and polity is more
significant.
Northern Ireland, as part of an established democratic state, was without many of
the basic post-accord electoral problems found in many other societies. There was a long
tradition of elections, established sophisticated political parties and – despite persistent
claims of electoral fraud - accurate electoral registers. Notwithstanding this history of
electoral competition, Northern Ireland’s post accord elections are of enormous
importance in providing evidence of the outworking of its peace accord. In the three
years following the Belfast Agreement five elections were held: a referendum on the
Agreement (May 1998) and elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly (June 1998),
European Parliament (June 1999), Local Government (June 2001), and Westminster
(June 2001).
The high number of electoral contests in a relatively short space of time meant
that Northern Ireland was in an almost permanent electoral cycle. While the Assembly
gave Northern Ireland’s four main parties the opportunity to govern for the first time in
many years, the switch from election campaigning to sharing power with electoral
competitors proved difficult to manage in the delicate infant years of the Assembly. The
Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, Sinn Féin, and the Social
Democratic and Labour Party cooperated as part of the permanent powersharing
government, yet they were competitors in elections to other chambers.i Reif and
Schmitt’s second-order election model can help offer insights into the post-Belfast
Agreement elections, particularly on issues of participation and the role of small parties.
Second-order elections
Reif and Schmitt’s seminal work identified national elections as first-order
elections, with other elections designated as second-order. Their interest was in the
connection between both sets of elections. The first direct elections to the European
Parliament, held across the nine member states in 1979, provided them with an
opportunity to compare voting behaviour in a single second-order political arena with
nine national, or first-order, arenas. Their framework for the analysis of second-order
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elections develops a series of hypotheses on the likely relationship between first and
second-order elections (Marsh, 1998). The three main hypotheses are:
1. That second-order elections will witness lower levels of participation.
2. That second–order elections will facilitate the development and growth of
new and small political parties.
3. That national government parties will lose popularity in second-order
contests.
Reif and Schmitt highlight a number of contextual factors and conditions that
should be taken into account when considering the hypotheses, such as possible
differences in electoral systems and rules between first and second-order contests, the
timing of the second-order election in the national election cycle, and the media attention
devoted to the different contests. Essentially though, they highlight the precedence of
national political cleavages over factors pertaining to the supra-national institution. In
other words, national politics are a key determinant in second-order elections.
Reif and Schmitt’s model has subsequently been refined – and largely validated –
by others. Norris (1997, 109-114) refers to it as ‘strikingly prescient and immensely
influential.’ Marsh (1998) tests it against four European elections in the 1979-97 period
and finds it largely robust. Others have investigated the first and second-order election
model in relation to national and sub-national elections. McAllister (2000, 211-222),
writing on the 1999 elections to the Welsh National Assembly, identifies a low turnout
and ‘a much more deliberate, sophisticated series of choices’ by voters as validating the
notion of elections other than to the national tier as being ‘second-order’.
Our task is to ascertain if Reif and Schmitt’s propositions hold true to Northern
Ireland in the wake of the devolution of power from London. A validation or rejection of
the second-order model may give an indication of the existence and extent of multi-level
voting in post-accord Northern Ireland. It may also point towards the electorate’s
acceptance of the devolved institutions in their own right or the extent to which the
devolved exercises have been overshadowed by wider, national political dynamics. The
three core propositions for second-order elections (lower participation; growth for small
and new parties; and a contraction for government parties) are reviewed in the light of
Northern Ireland’s first and second-order elections in the 1996-2001 period.ii On the basis
of the evidence presented below, it is possible to construct a prima facie case in support
of the first two propositions, although the third proposition has little relevance for
Northern Ireland.
An analysis section considers possible reasons for the variations in turnout and
small party fortunes in first and second-order contests and highlights the importance of
factors specific to Northern Ireland and its peace process. Indeed, the strength of these
local factors challenges one of Reif and Schmitt’s key propositions: that national politics
will be a major determinant on the outcome of second-order contests. While the British
government plays a major role at the macro level, for example by setting election dates,
Northern Ireland’s elections are decided by Northern Ireland-specific factors. In other
words, the ‘national’ in Northern Ireland is Northern Ireland itself, rather than the UK.
Added to this is the problem that the ‘nation’ is deeply divided.
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Lower participation?
According to Reif and Schmitt, second-order elections can be characterised by lower
participation than in first-order elections. In fact it was a second-order election, the 1998
Northern Ireland Assembly election that recorded the highest turnout in the 1996-2001
period. The 69.9% turnout on that occasion however, was only slightly ahead of Northern
Ireland’s turnout at the 1997 and 2001 British general elections (67.3% and 68.04%
respectively).iii In the case of the Assembly election at least, it can be argued that
Northern Ireland’s electors attached marginally more significance to a second-order
rather than first-order contest. The Assembly elections apart, however, turnout for the
general elections exceeded that for the other elections in the time-period and does allow a
partial validation of Reif and Schmitt’s thesis of the precedence of the national political
arena.iv (See Table 1).
Election
%
Turnout

1996
1997
Forum General
Election
64.7
67.3

1997
Local
Govt.
54.7

1998
1999
Assembl European
y
Parliament
69.9
57.04

2001
Local
Govt.
66.02

2001
General
Election
68.04

Table 1: Turnout in Northern Ireland elections, 1996-2001.
Brighter prospects for small and new parties?
Reif and Schmitt assert that second-order elections will offer brighter prospects
for small and new parties. This is potentially significant for a post-accord society since
the growth of small and new parties may signal a fragmentation of established ethnic
bloc politics. In absolute terms, Northern Ireland has seen a relative proliferation of
parties or independent candidates in its second-order contests. Twenty-four separate
parties or independents contested the 1996 Forum elections and 33 parties or
independents contested the 1998 Assembly election, as against 18 and 16 in the 1997
and 2001 general elections respectively. Indeed, the Forum and Assembly elections
witnessed the first electoral outing for a number of new or re-invigorated political
parties. The Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition was formed in advance of the 1996
election, while the Progressive Unionist Party and Ulster Democratic Party, although
already in existence, re-entered the electoral process for these elections.
But the figures showing the relative proliferation of parties in second-order
contests as opposed to first-order contests are less impressive if the larger number of
seats available in the second-order contests is taken into account. In the 1996 Forum
election an average of 3.6 candidates stood for each directly elected seat,v while an
average of 2.7 candidates contested each seat in the 1998 Assembly election. These
figures are lower than the average of 6.94 and 5.55 candidates who contested each of
Northern Ireland’s eighteen seats in the 1997 and 2001 general elections. In the 1999
European election eight parties contested Northern Ireland’s three Euro seats, or 2.6 per
seat.
Regardless of the actual contestation of elections, Reif and Schmitt’s main point
was that small and new parties would perform relatively better in second-order than
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first-order contests. A constant feature of Northern Ireland’s political landscape has
been the dominance of four political parties: Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP), Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Sinn Féin. In
the period under consideration, they have between them secured an average of 85.16%
of votes cast in each election, pointing to significant electoral oligarchy. The highest
combined vote for ‘the Big Four’ (91.89%) occurred in a first-order election (2001
general election) but this was only marginally ahead of the combined 91.36% secured in
the 1999 European Parliament elections – a second-order contest. Nevertheless, smaller
parties secured 21.05% of the vote in the 1998 Assembly election, with this figure
dropping to 8.11% in the 2001 general election, pointing to a validation of Reif and
Schmitt’s thesis. (See Table 2).
1996
1997
1997
1998
1999
2001
2001
Election Forum General Local
Assembly European Local
General
Election Government
Parliament Government Election
% of
79.8
86.5
83.2
78.95
91.36
84.48
91.89
votes
cast for
the ‘Big
Four’
Table 2: Combined percentage of the vote for the UUP, DUP, SDLP and SF in 19962001 elections
Government parties will lose popularity?
Reif and Schmitt’s proposition that government parties will lose popularity in
second-order elections is difficult to apply to Northern Ireland given that until the
creation of the Assembly none of the parties had been members of a government for
some time. If the proposition is modified to say that the dominant (rather than
governing) political parties will lose popularity, then, as Table 2 shows, the ‘Big Four’
did experience some electoral slippage in second-order contests. But to argue this is to
stretch Reif and Schmitt beyond their original meaning. Indeed, it is only through the
second-order elections to the Assembly that Northern Ireland’s parties have experienced
government, and as will be argued later, the attitudes to the devolved institutions (rather
than performance in them) were key factors in the 2001 general election.
Discussion
On this evidence, it is possible to identify differences between the results in first
and second-order elections in Northern Ireland and extend partial validation to the
second-order election model. Local factors are worth stressing though. Many of the
differences between first and second-order elections are specific to Northern Ireland and
its peace process and may resist generalisation to other cases.
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Turnout is highest in the 1998 Assembly election, but is generally higher in firstorder elections.
It is unsurprising that turnout in the 1998 election to the devolved Assembly
surpassed that for other elections. This was not a simple case of a re-arrangement of the
locus of power from the centre to the periphery. Instead, the creation of the Assembly
marked the institutional culmination of a complex and long-running peace process. Public
interest was immense, as evidenced by the 81% turnout in the May 1998 referendum on
the Belfast Agreement. The establishment of an Assembly per se met with relatively little
opposition in the multi-party talks leading to the Belfast Agreement. Virtually everything
else connected with the Assembly was contested though. The new institution’s name,
location, size, method of election, number and competence of departments, and linkages
with other bodies created under the Belfast Agreement, were all the subject of argument.
There was much at stake for both communities. The 1998 referendum is thought
to have produced a fairly even split between pro and anti-Agreement unionists (although
both sides claimed to represent a majority of unionists) (Mitchell, 2001; 30-31). Most
opposition came from the DUP, although substantial numbers of UUP supporters,
including senior party figures, were opposed to the Agreement. Points of opposition were
numerous, including the early release programme for paramilitary prisoners, the failure of
paramilitary organisations to disarm and the prospect of major police reform. Perhaps the
key sticking point for unionists was the prospect of the inclusion of Sinn Féin, whom they
regarded as unreconstructed terrorists, in the new powersharing coalition Executive.vi
Rather than boycotting the elections, anti-Agreement unionists were determined
that ‘No’ voters should be represented in the Assembly. The Democratic Unionists, who
had been absent from the political negotiations leading to the Belfast Agreement and who
were bitterly opposed to the Agreement, nonetheless promised electors that they would
‘be hard at work in the new Assembly representing your interests’ (emphasis added.
DUP, 1998). Other anti-Agreement unionists, in the form of the United Kingdom
Unionist Party, termed the election as ‘one FINAL CHANCE’ to counter a range of
perceived threats, including ‘a return to full scale violence’ and ‘armed terrorists
governing you’ (UKUP, 1998).
The official message from the Ulster Unionist Party accentuated the positive. UUP
leader David Trimble noted that, ‘We have the chance to move into a new era for the sake
of our children and to seize the enormous economic benefits that will flow from the
Agreement. For this we need to elect members dedicated to progress, not those there to
wreck this chance or merely to oppose and complain about everything (UUP, 1998).’ The
result was an emotive and bitter election campaign within unionism.
Nationalists and republicans needed no encouragement to contest this election.
Their traditional suspicions of Northern Ireland assemblies as ‘internal settlements’ had
been assuaged by a number of guarantees linked to the establishment of the Assembly,
particularly the ‘all-Ireland’ dimension afforded by the North-South Ministerial Council.
For the two main nationalist parties, the SDLP and Sinn Féin, the Assembly represented
an opportunity wrest power from Westminster. For republicans, it was another step in the
broader nationalist project of moving towards a united Ireland, with Sinn Féin terming the
election ‘a watershed moment in our history which must be seized’ (Sinn Féin, 1998a).
The election also represented an opportunity to resume battle for supremacy within the
nationalist community.
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Most Northern Ireland elections are keenly contested, with the unionist-nationalist
constitutional cleavage also containing bitter intra-community competitions. But the 1998
Assembly election had an additional novelty and seriousness. There was a public
understanding that this was a defining moment in the peace process, and would shape the
new political dispensation. The Assembly may have been a subordinate institution, but for
the main ethnic parties, it was essential that they secure maximum ownership of that
institution and effect maximum denial to their political opponents. As a Sinn Féin election
leaflet put it: ‘Your vote can maximise nationalist strength, deliver real change and
advance Irish unity’ (Sinn Féin, 1998b).
The 1998 Assembly election aside, turnout has been highest in first-order contests.
It is difficult to argue that this was for anything other than local reasons. With the
exception of a Conservative fragment (securing 0.3% of the vote in Northern Ireland in
June 2001), the British parties do not stand for election in Northern Ireland. Nor has there
been a recent need for Northern Ireland’s parties to contribute to Westminster coalition
governments.vii The trends and issues affecting the outcome of the general election in
England, Scotland and Wales have little bearing in Northern Ireland. Commenting in the
Guardian during the 2001 general election campaign, Matthew Engel described Northern
Ireland’s electoral exceptionalism in somewhat graphic terms:
Elections in Britain are essentially homogenous: about the same arguments
with local variations. But out here [Northern Ireland] the dispute between
Blair and Hague and is barely even reported; Northern Ireland, as ever,
disappeared up its own backside. It’s as though the PM’s [Prime
Minister’s] decision to call an election also triggered a vote in Albania or
Alpha Centauri (Guardian, 2001).
Health, education, immigration, Europe, welfare spending and Deputy Prime
Minister John Prescott’s pugilism, the issues that dominated the 2001 general election
in England, Scotland and Wales, may as well have been issues from another planet.
Northern Ireland’s general election was about Northern Ireland itself. But the 2001
general election saw an interesting twist. While the national issue (Northern Ireland’s
constitutional status) continued to dominate, attitudes to the Assembly gave entrenched
disputes a new spin. In something of a reversal of the Reif and Schmitt thesis, issues
germane to a second-order political arena dominated a first-order contest.
Ever since April 1998, the Agreement (and by extension the Assembly) had
dominated political debate in Northern Ireland. The traditional unionist-nationalist
cleavage remained largely intact, but the Agreement gave it a new focal point and
arenas of contestation. Post-Agreement politics revolved around rejection or acceptance
of, deviation from, breaches of, implementation of, reviews of, and interpretations of
the Agreement. As a result, the Agreement and its implications were the key issues in
the June 1999 European and June 2001 Westminster elections, particularly within
unionism.
In fact, the DUP (1999) attempted to recast the European elections into a re-run
of the referendum on the Agreement, describing it as electors’ ‘only chance to reverse
the treachery of the past year’ and urging voters to give their leader Ian Paisley his
highest ever vote. The Assembly was at the centre of the UUP general election
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campaign. Their election literature told voters: ‘The choice couldn’t be clearer. The
DUP want to destroy the Agreement, bringing down our Stormont Assembly. [UUP
leader] David Trimble…needs every vote in order to stop them’ (UUP, 2001). David
Trimble even made his pledge to resign as Assembly First Minister if the IRA refused
to move on arms decommissioning a centre-piece of his Westminster campaign. In a
sense, the first-order contest focused almost exclusively on issues relevant to the
second-order arena.
Second-order elections offer opportunities for new and small parties. Northern
Ireland’s second-order elections, particularly the 1996 Forum and 1998 Assembly
elections, have seen a proliferation of small and new parties. The peculiar circumstances
of the peace process go a long way in explaining this phenomenon. A key factor has
been the fragmentation of the unionist vote. Peace processes place political and military
actors under enormous pressures, confronting them with new experiences, discourses,
propositions and compromises (Darby & Mac Ginty 2003). While some political actors
may be tempted to investigate compromise and pragmatism, others may take a more
principled or resolute stand. The Northern Ireland peace process posed unionists, and
the UUP in particular, with a series of difficult choices. The essential issue was one of
whether they should engage with a peace process based on the idea of including those
linked with militant organisations. For many within the UUP, and unionism in general,
this meant compromising basic democratic principles. Once involved in the peace
process, the dilemma became the extent of the involvement. Ultimately, with the Belfast
Agreement, the issue became whether or not the UUP should enter into a powersharing
government with Sinn Féin. Each hurdle, and attendant issues involving prisoners,
policing and disarmament, placed unionism under immense pressure. Given such a
context, it was unsurprising that a mixture of new and longstanding political rivals
should attempt to exploit the apparent divisions within unionism when the electoral
cycle presented them with the opportunity to do so.
Added to this was the widespread unionist perception of the peace process in
terms of concessions and loss. Many unionists regarded the peace process as a
nationalist project in origin and design and one that would inevitably result in the
erosion of the unionist position. In such circumstances, unionists were able to accuse
each other of ‘selling out’, so producing a fertile ground for intra-unionist fissures.
While nationalists and republicans, in the form of the SDLP and Sinn Féin, may
have disagreed over the pace and extent of the peace process, they were largely in
favour of the process. As a result, there was little evidence of a shredding of the
nationalist vote during the peace process. Electoral competition between the SDLP and
Sinn Féin was intense, and while Sinn Féin’s vote rose from 1996 onwards, the SDLP’s
vote did not substantially decline (mainly as a result of a growing Catholic population).
No serious electoral competitor emerged from within nationalism to threaten the SDLP
or Sinn Féin. While Sinn Féin’s militant wing suffered desertions and discontent, this
was not evident on the electoral front.
The electoral systems chosen for the second-order contests may have also
encouraged smaller parties to contest the elections. Certainly this was a conscious aim
of those who designed the electoral systems. The principle of inclusion was a
cornerstone of the peace process, and in the case of the 1996 Forum election in
particular, the electoral system was designed to enhance the chances of the inclusion of
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the small loyalist parties in future political negotiations.viii If anything, the ‘top-up’
system chosen was too successful with the tiny Northern Ireland Labour Party securing
two ‘top-up’ seats with 0.85% of the vote.
While we can use peace process-specific factors to explain the relative
proliferation and prosperity of new and small parties in second-order elections, it must
be noted that many of these factors also pertain to first-order contests in which the ‘Big
Four’ dominate.
Perceptions of the Assembly as a first order chamber
Thus far there is evidence that Northern Ireland’s electors regard elections to the
devolved second order Assembly as a first order contest. As argued, this is largely a
function of factors pertaining to the ethno-national conflict, a conflict that has been - in
certain respects - politically radicalised by the peace process. Data from the Northern
Ireland Life and Times survey of political attitudes reinforces the view that Northern
Ireland’s electors are willing to regard the Assembly as a first order institution. The
survey sample was 1800 adults (67 per cent response rate) and was funded by the
Economic and Social Research Council.ix The fieldwork was conducted in OctoberDecember 2001. It is worth noting that the period preceding the fieldwork, and the
fieldwork period itself, witnessed considerable political instability.
Asked first of all to identify the institution that has most say on how Northern
Ireland is run, 51 per cent of respondents identify the UK government at Westminster as
the institution wielding most power. (See Table 3). Twenty-eight per cent of respondents
said that the Northern Ireland Assembly had most influence. This in itself is a significant
figure given the Assembly’s uncertain beginnings. Other options, such as local
government in Northern Ireland or the European Union attracted little support and it is
worth noting that there was little divergence in Catholic and Protestant opinion with
regard to where power lies.
Protestant Catholic All
%
%
%
The Northern Ireland Assembly
29
28
28
The UK government at Westminster
50
53
51
Local Councils in Northern Ireland
6
8
7
The European Union
4
5
4
Other
3
1
2
Don’t know
8
6
8
Table 3: Which of the following has most influence over the way Northern Ireland is
run?
On the question of which institution should hold most influence on the way
that Northern Ireland is run, a strong majority (65 per cent) opt for the Assembly. This
comprises of majorities of both Catholics and Protestants, with the former more
wholehearted in their support for the devolved institution. Seventeen per cent say that
the UK government in Westminster should have most power, comprised of just under
a quarter of Protestants and only 7 per cent of Catholics. Almost four times as many
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people were prepared to award primacy in government to the Stormont Assembly that
to the ‘mother of all parliaments’. The results indicate that people would like to see
more power devolved to Northern Ireland.
Protestant Catholic All
%
%
%
The Northern Ireland Assembly
61
74
65
The UK government at Westminster
24
7
17
Local Councils in Northern Ireland
6
8
7
The European Union
1
3
2
Other
2
1
2
Don’t know
6
7
8
Table 4: Which of the following ought to have most influence over
the way Northern Ireland is run?
Given devolution’s inauspicious start in Northern Ireland, these figures are
remarkable. The summer and autumn of 2001 saw David Trimble’s resignation as First
Minister in an attempt to force the IRA to begin decommissioning its arms. The period
saw intensive political talks convened by the British and Irish governments, two 24 hour
‘technical’ suspensions of the devolution, an attempt by the UUP and DUP to have Sinn
Féin excluded from the Executive, and the resignation of the three UUP ministers from
the Executive. The period also saw the ‘brawl in the hall’ when Members of the
Legislative Assembly from a number of parties scuffled in the foyer of the Assembly in
front of television cameras, as well as considerable sectarian violence on the streets. In
October 2001 the IRA began actual decommissioning, enabling a modicum of political
stability to return.
Yet despite this unpromising context, the survey indicates that public faith in the
devolved institution remains strong. Other survey results, for example on public
perceptions of the Assembly’s handling of key policy areas such as health, education and
the economy, are less flattering and suggest that public faith in the Assembly is just that:
a faith that has yet to be realised. Nevertheless, the survey results reinforce the notion that
many people in Northern Ireland regard the Assembly as a first order institution.
A question remains though: do people in Northern Ireland regard the Northern
Ireland Assembly as a first order institution as the most appropriate body within which to
pursue constitutional issues? Or, do they regard it as an institution in which to prioritise
day-to-day issues? The answer to the question is likely to have profound implications for
the possibility of multi-level voting in future years.
There are good reasons why electors might be tempted to view the Assembly as
yet another, and perhaps as the most appropriate, arena for nationalist-unionist
constitutional competition. The Assembly is more immediate and novel than other
institutions. It is dedicated to Northern Ireland issues, attracts considerable local media
attention, and provides a forum for face-to-face confrontation between nationalists,
republicans, unionists and loyalists. If Northern Ireland’s electors regard the Assembly as
an arena primarily to pursue constitutional claims, then the prospects of multi-level voting
will be slim. Assembly elections will merely be an avenue for electoral warfare by other
means.
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On the other hand, people may regard the Assembly as a first order institution
because of its capacity to deal with day-to-day issues. Under this scenario, there may even
be scope for multi-level voting, with electors making decisions based on the actual
performance of parties and politicians in the Assembly. Future Assembly elections will
offer voters a chance to demonstrate multi-level voting, but given the Assembly’s rocky
start, there can be few illusions.
Conclusions
A partial validation of the second-order election framework aside, there seems to
be little evidence of multi-level voting in the sense of ethnic cleavages eroding. Thus far,
devolution has not encouraged movement towards the political centre-ground, nor the
prospect of voters crossing communal boundaries. The electoral fortunes of the cross
community Alliance Party of Northern Ireland suffered disastrously during the peace
process. Similarly, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, which deliberately eschewed
taking positions on constitutional issues, failed to secure significant electoral success,
(regardless of its other successes in facilitating talks between other parties). If anything,
the nature of the peace process has encouraged a re-entrenchment of two sets of
nationalism: a northern Irish nationalism and an Ulster British nationalism.
The peace process and subsequent Agreement have emphasised the need to
accommodate both sets of nationalism within a single political dispensation. Both were
deemed legitimate. They would co-exist and their interaction would be managed through
new consociational institutions. Nationalists would remain nationalist, and unionists
would remain unionist. Moreover, following ceasefires, legitimacy and inclusion were
extended to the more extreme versions of these nationalisms: republicanism and loyalism.
The new political dispensation has many merits, and encouraging signs of ‘normality’ in
government are emerging. Yet many of the underlying causes of the conflict remain unaddressed. In many respects, the peace accord represented an ‘agreement’ rather than a
‘settlement’. Reaching such an agreement was no small feat. The basic parameters of the
conflict remain however, albeit moderated through a sophisticated array of institutions. In
such circumstances, expectations of multi-level voting may be optimistic.
Also apparent are the sensitivities associated with post-accord elections. Rather
than marking the symbolic endpoint to a conflict, post-accord elections have the capacity
to radicalise and re-entrench the conflict. This raises profound questions for the norms of
liberalism and democracy that underpinned many of the international interventions into
ethnonational conflicts from the 1990s and beyond. It seems clear that early elections
have been counterproductive in a number of locations and have not engendered deeprooted processes of democratization. This raises awkward questions of alternatives and
seeming double standards in which democracy is promoted in one area (BosniaHerzegovina) but delayed and hollowed-out in another (Afghanistan).
In many ways Northern Ireland’s problems were of a different magnitude to those
in other post-accord zones. But Northern Ireland’s post-accord elections can offer a
number of lessons to other societies embarking on the transition from violent conflict to
‘peace’. First, the case illustrates that sophisticated electoral processes designed to
maximize inclusivity in deeply divided societies offer few guarantees of an erosion of
ethnic cleavages. In simple terms, there are limits to electoral engineering if the bases of
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the conflict remain intact. Second, the Northern Ireland case illustrates that although the
symbolic value of post-accord elections is high, this is fleeting and less significant than
substantial issues such as the outcome of the election. Third, and somewhat counterintuitively, electoral processes in the midst of on-going or unresolved conflicts can
hamper democratisation. Tension from election campaigns to other chambers have
disrupted the bedding down of Northern Ireland’s Assembly. Ideas of graduated
democratisation in which there is an inter-regnum to allow for the development of a
democratic culture are worth consideration.
Fourth, concentration on inter-group competition in deeply divided societies often
means that intra-group competition receives relatively scant attention. Yet, for many
people in post-accord societies, competition within ethnic blocs will be their primary
political experience. As a result, civil society initiatives designed to contribute to
processes of democratisation may find it necessary to engage in single-identity work as
well as cross-community activity. A final lesson from Northern Ireland may be more
positive; that post-accord elections do have the capacity to change the boundaries of the
conflict and offer opportunities for the emergence of new issues, personnel and political
arenas. With time it will become clear if these new issues, personnel and political arenas
can outweigh the inheritance of ‘old-style’ constitutional politics.
Endnotes
1

The Democratic Unionist Party, although taking their positions as Ministers in the
Northern Ireland Executive, did not attend ministerial meetings in protest at the presence
of Sinn Féin in government. They did participate in committee meetings that involved
Sinn Féin though.
2
Election figures are based on post-election results in the Irish Times and from the CAIN
website: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/.
The June 1998 referendum on the Belfast Agreement is not considered here because it
was not an election to a specific chamber.
3
Turnout in the May 1998 referendum on the Agreement was 80.98%. It is also worth
noting that turnout was ahead of that in the 1999 elections to the Welsh National
Assembly (46.4%) and Scottish Parliament (58.8%).
4
It may be worth noting that the relatively high turnout recorded for the 2001 local
government election may have been because the election was held on the same day as the
general election.
5
The Forum for Political Dialogue had 100 seats, of which 90 were directly elected and
the ten parties polling the highest number of votes were awarded two ‘top-up’ seats each.
6
The DUP Assembly election manifesto listed the following concerns on the back cover:
Unreconstructed terrorists in government; the retention of illegal weapons by terrorists;
the plans for the destruction of the RUC; All-Ireland bodies with executive powers; the
mass release of terrorists; British sovereignty being eroded.
7
With dwindling support from his own backbenches, John Major relied on the support of
Ulster Unionist MPs to pass the 1993 Maastricht Bill. This did not lead to a formal
coalition though. See Major (2000) 378-81.
8
For an explanation of the electoral system, see ‘How delegates were elected’, Irish
Times (1 June 1996).
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9

The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey is continuous survey of social attitudes
based at the University of Ulster and the Queen’s University of Belfast. The survey was
conducted via face-to-face interviews with an achieved sample of 1800 adults across
Northern Ireland. A Postcode Address File (PAF) sampling frame was used, with one
adult from the household selected for interview using a Kish grid method. As is common
in Northern Ireland, a simple random sample was drawn and stratified across three
regions, but without any clustering. The face-to-face interviews were conducted using a
computer-assisted technique. A self-completion supplement was given to each respondent
at the end of the interview for the field workers to collect at a later date.
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THE ROLE OF ARTISTIC PROCESSES IN PEACEBUILDING IN
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Craig Zelizer
Abstract
Throughout the world, community arts-based processes have become an essential component of
peacebuilding work in societies experiencing severe conflicts. Both during a conflict and in
post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, community based arts processes can be an especially
effective tool to bring together identity groups through sharing common cultural experiences,
raising awareness about past suffering, and engaging communities in creative projects. In this
research project, the author spent fourteen months in Bosnia-Herzegovina researching the use of
community arts-based peacebuilding efforts both during the war and in the post-conflict stage.
This paper provides an overview of the research and offers several conclusions on the role of
arts in peacebuilding within Bosnia-Herzegovina with the hope that these findings have
relevance for other regions and the field in general.
Introduction
During the past decade throughout Southeastern Europe violent conflicts have erupted
resulting in significant destruction in both social and economic terms. The causes of each
conflict involves a complex series of interconnected factors including the severe economic crises
affecting the entire region, lack of moderate political leadership, and the increasing emphasis on
ethnicity as a central component of identity (see Byrne and Carter, 1996). Prior to the outbreak
of conflict in each location, an increasingly nationalist discourse developed which has defined
“other” ethnic groups as the enemy who threaten the existence of one’s own group.
In contrast to the extreme nationalistic discourse that has helped fuel the recent conflicts
in the Balkans, the region also has a long tradition of co-existence, with different ethnic and
religious groups living together in relative peace for decades. Both during and after the most
recent wars, civil society initiatives have played an essential role in speaking out against war,
helping to foster reconciliation between parties, building community across ethnic lines and
encouraging the peaceful resolution of conflicts. One area within civil society based
peacebuilding efforts, which has not received a significant amount of scholarly focus is the role
of arts-based activities in peacebuilding efforts. In particular, in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
international and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and artists are well known for
their efforts during the war, in which they protested against the violence, conducted creative
therapy projects and organized hundreds of theater and music performances, both at the elite and
grassroots levels. Moreover since the end of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina these efforts have
continued with numerous international and local NGOs and artists using community based arts
activities to help facilitate reconciliation between ethnic groups.
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Despite the widespread use of arts-based processes in peacebuilding work in the conflict
resolution field, to date there has only been minimal research on arts and peacebuilding. Given
this lack of research, relevant theory, and descriptive writings about the use of the arts in conflict
situations, I believe this is a significant gap in the field. In order to begin addressing this gap, I
spent fourteen months, from September 2000 to December 2001 living in Bosnia-Herzegovina
researching the use of community based performing arts in post-war peacebuilding efforts and an
exploration of the intersection of arts and peacebuilding during the war. This paper will provide
an overview of the framework that guided my research, a brief summary of methodology and
offer several conclusions on the role of arts in peacebuilding within Bosnia-Herzegovina with the
hopes that these findings have relevance for other regions and the field in general.
Goals of Research
There are several reasons for conducting research on the nexus of arts and conflict
resolution. First, I believe the arts hold significant potential for improving relations between
identity groups in conflict and are an area that has received scant attention within the conflict
resolution and peacebuilding fields. Despite conflict resolution’s innovative approach to
mitigating conflicts at different levels, there is a strong emphasis on more cognitive and
traditional types of problem solving often at the exclusion of more creative and affective
approaches (Cohen, 1997; Lumsden, 1999; Senehi, 2002; Zelizer, 1997). Many traditional
conflict resolution processes are centered on more linear, rational forms of communication that
often do not allow space for more creative or alternative ways of interacting, or expressing
emotions and thoughts (Senehi, 2000, 2002; Zelizer, 1997). Because of the arts extensive use of
non-linear and creative methods of expression, I believe they can often provide an avenue for
facilitating increased understanding and positive interaction between groups in conflict in
appropriate settings.
In contrast to the underlying motivations for the research outlined above, by no means do
I want to give the impression that the arts are inherently orientated toward generating peace.
Throughout history and more recently in Southeastern Europe many artists and arts based
processes have also served to reinforce nationalist ideologies, foster divisions and provide
justification for barbarous acts (Wilmer, 2002; Kelly, 2000). Thus, this research endeavor
acknowledges that the arts can be used in a variety of capacities, but focuses on those processes
that are orientated to building peace and reconciliation.
General Theoretical Background
Given the limited writing on the topic, this research design and inquiry are exploratory in
nature. However, in an effort to locate the research within existing scholarship in the conflict
resolution field, several fields of literature were reviewed which are described below.
Civil Society and Peacebuilding
Arts-based peacebuilding efforts can be situated within the larger framework of civil
society based initiatives for peacebuilding. Such activities might range from joint economic
projects, to grassroots mediation and dialogue programs. Several analytical frameworks have
been developed to elucidate the theory and practice of civil society based peacebuilding
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processes. One of the most helpful models that several scholars have developed is the distinction
between peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Diamond and
McDonald, 1996; Galtung, 1995; Lederach, 1997; Sandole, 1998). According to this model,
there are different processes and approaches that can be used for conflict resolution work, which
depend on the particular stage of the conflict.
Within the two categories of peacemaking (addressing a specific conflict) and
peacebuilding (transforming relationships and institutions), significant emphasis has been placed
on the importance of civil society based initiatives (Diamond and McDonald, 1996; Fisher, 1993,
1997; Lederach, 1997). Several scholars and practitioners have researched the nature of
activities, which can be conducted at the community level during the peacemaking and
peacebuilding stages (Galtung, 1996; Lederach, 1997). These activities can be divided into two
main types: those that focus on the structural issues of a conflict, such as governmental and
economic policy, and reforming institutions; and those that are concerned with improving
relations between groups. The majority of activities within the relational approach focus on
dialogue approaches to increase understanding and trust between groups in conflict, and to
facilitate interaction through community projects.
The underlying basis for this approach is that an essential component of reconciliation
and trust building involves the reconstruction or reconfiguration of relationships between parties
in conflict (Broome, 1993; Kelman, 1997; Rothman, 1997; Sandole, 1998). In addition to
peacebuilding, education and economic development projects, several scholars (Epskamp, 1999;
Galtung, 1995; Lederach, 1997; Liebmann, 1996; Lumsden, 1999; Senehi, 2002) list the arts as a
potential process to foster peacebuilding efforts at the community level in conflict-ridden
societies however most do not explore this in much depth.
Lumsden's (1999) three zones of social reconstruction is another model that is helpful in
exploring the role of arts. He outlines three areas, which need to be addressed in post-conflict
reconstruction, including the outer social world; the inner psychological world and a transitional
zone between the two (Lumsden, 1999). The arts have an important role to play in this
transitional area, as Lumsden indicates they can help with healing, exploring ideas and helping to
integrate the inner and outer worlds.
Overall the importance of civil society based activities in helping to prevent and also help
parties reconcile from conflict is essential. The arts are one additional process that can support
peacebuilding work. Moreover, given the overly rational focus of many Western forms of
peacebuilding, and the irrational nature of most conflicts, arts-based approaches to peacebuilding
offer an important avenue to assist with peacebuilding efforts.
Arts/Peacebuilding
To date several initial works have appeared linking conflict resolution and art. The most
significant work to address the connection is the book, Arts Approaches to Conflict, edited by
Marian Liebmann (1996), which consists of essays by art therapists using arts techniques with a
variety of populations. Although the work presents a number of interesting cases, there is little
development of theory or of the application of the arts-based approaches beyond the
interpersonal level. Another collection of essays on the arts and conflict are in the book People
Building Peace 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, in particular writings by Kees
Epskamp (1999) who has conducted extensive research on the role of arts in development.
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Lumsden (1999) suggests that the arts and artists have a critical role to play in postconflict reconstruction in that they can help foster a creative process for rebuilding social
relationships. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, some examples of arts-based peacebuilding that
have been used to rebuild social relationships include: the Pavarotti Music center in the divided
city of Mostar, which facilitates interaction between Croats and Muslims through musical
exchanges; and the work of the Open Society Institute, which supports a network of Balkan
artists across geographical space to explore issues of reconciliation.
Apart from efforts in the Balkans, in conflict regions throughout the world, the arts have
often had a significant impact on bringing together divided communities. Examples include
community theater productions and mural projects in Northern Ireland, Africa, and the Middle
East; peace concerts on the dividing line in Cyprus and Angola; and bi-communal orchestras
and poetry groups in the Middle East. Local community groups, artists, and NGOs conducting
peacebuilding work have organized the majority of these efforts.
In conflicts on the verge of violence, the arts can also help raise awareness of the
dangers of impending conflict and speak out in favor of peace. Throughout the world, artsbased forms of expressions have been an essential component of anti-war demonstrations and
protests for social justice and equality. Moreover, theater and other arts based activities have
long been used as a tool for educating and uniting communities to work towards collective
action or to facilitate community problem solving within the field of development (Mada,
1993). Moreover during the war in Bosnia the arts also played a vital role in the struggle of the
citizens of Sarajevo to survive the years of siege. Through underground concerts, plays, and
performances, the city was able to keep hope alive, provide entertainment to people, and keep
the creative spirit alive (Sarajevski, 1996).
There are several possible approaches for community-based arts peacebuilding work.
First, arts-based peacebuilding activities can be carried out for the community as a form of
performance enacted by professionals in a traditional scripted drama or a concert. In this case,
the audience interprets the medium being presented by the performers which may have an
impact on the community or audience consciousness. Another approach to arts-based activities
is when the activity emerges from the community itself (more process orientated) such as
participatory theater, community arts festival or other forums. In this case the impact of the art
may be on several levels. First, the participants in the project will come together to create a
product and through this process of creation and interaction their attitudes and behavior can be
affected. Second, given the public performance of a product, this can also have an impact on
the community or audience witnessing the performance directly (McConachie, 1998).
One of the central questions regarding the role of arts in conflict resolution is to what
purpose is the activity being carried out? Is the work being done by artists for the purposes of
artistic expression or is it is being conducted as a more explicit conflict resolution or
peacebuilding process? The distinction between these two approaches may be somewhat
artificial, but serves as a useful analytical tool to distinguish between art activities that are
primarily focused on the product and those that are focused more on the process (Epskamp,
1999).
There are several inherent challenges in addressing the connection between arts and
peacebuilding. First, the arts are only one of a number of peacebuilding processes that can have
an impact on both the conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. A second challenge, is
distinguishing the purpose of art and its possible impact. Not all art is geared towards positive
or destructive purpose; a great deal of art is created simply for expressive purposes without a
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larger goal of promoting any specific outcome. However in order to narrow down the research
I do focus on processes that have an implicit or explicit connection to peacebuilding (Senehi,
2002, Epskamp, 1999). Finally, in this research project, I focused primarily on community
based interactive arts processes in the performing arts, as I believe they have a greater potential
to affect change than the visual arts due to their more participatory and interactive nature.
The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Much has been written about the course of events that led to the tragedy of the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over the course of the almost five year war, over 200,000 individuals
(mostly civilians) were killed, nearly 2 million people became displaced and hundreds of
thousands of people were wounded (Glenny, 1994; Sudetic, 1998). One of the central arenas of
the war was the siege of Sarajevo, which was the longest siege in modern history, lasting over
1000 days. Bosnian Serb forces encircled the city, with constant shelling, sometimes thousands
per day, cutting off electricity, gas, phone lines and access to the outside world. Despite the
harsh conditions inside of Sarajevo a unique cultural life sprang up during the war, with
hundreds of theater performances, concerts, exhibitions and even film festivals and cultural
events. In addition to the work of artists, the small civil society sector composed of locals and
internationals conducted numerous creative therapy and arts and peacebuilding projects.
During the war the overwhelming focus of the arts life in Bosnia was based in Sarajevo,
in one theater alone, the Kamerni Theater, there were over 800 performances of theater, music,
prayers for peace and more (FAMA, 2000). In addition, there were countless performances
among in orphanages and shelters throughout the city, exhibitions of artwork composed of
material from the war, several concerts with leading international composers, and visits from
international artists (Sarajevski, 1996). In addition to Sarajevo, several other regions of
Bosnia-Herzegovina also had an active arts life under the extreme circumstances, especially in
the cities of Mostar and Tuzla.
After the war the cultural life in Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina continued
to operate under very difficult conditions consisting of the lack of funding and personnel, a
destroyed infrastructure and constant economic and political instability. Despite these
challenges, a number of artists and peacebuilders developed arts-based projects to help bridge
the severe divide in Bosnian society. Such projects ranged from an inter-faith choir,
community based drama work, drumming for peace circles, and art therapy projects.
Based on the analysis of my research it is clear that the role of arts based activities had
different functions during the war and in the post-war setting. Prior to the field research a
preliminary framework for categorizing the types of arts-based approaches (specific to BosniaHerzegovina) was developed.
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Types of Arts-Based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Category
Training
Tool

Product
Based

Process
Based

Social
Protest

Description
As a training tool in conflict
resolution. Arts can help participants
develop skills, experientially explore
conflicts, increase creativity and
increase trust between participants
(Pipkin & Dimenna, 1989; Yaffe,
1990)
When the product itself is the
primary goal. The art may have an
impact on the community or a
conflict, but the process of creating
the product is not emphasized
(Epskamp, 1999)
As a process-orientated approach
where identity groups in conflict
come together and work on
reconciliation issues through creating
shared work, which may also have an
impact on larger the community. The
process of creating the product is one
of the main foci of the work
(Epskamp, 1999)
As a form of speaking out against
conflict, protesting against injustice
and raising awareness. This can take
place at various stages of a conflict,
but often occurs at highly escalated
stages or when there is a significant
power imbalance (Bartelt, 1997,
Freire, 1997, Lederach, 1995).

Example
Education and Youth
Peacebuilding Project
in Bosnia; local
trainings that
incorporate theater
based techniques.
Plays produced in
Sarajevo during the
war. Much of
contemporary,
traditional art in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
An example in
Bosnia is, an
interreligious, interethnic choir in
Sarajevo.

Examples include the
famous violin concert
by Vedran Smaljovic in
Sarajevo during the
war and the production
of musical Hair during
the war.

These arts-based approaches are by no means exclusionary and in many ways overlap.
Arts processes that fit within the social protest framework may also be somewhat product or
process focused.
The Research Process
Based on the review literature in several fields, and the specific situation in BosniaHerzegovina, several guiding propositions helped frame the study which include:
1) There is a significant degree of overlap between the work of artists and peacebuilding
and this link needs to be explored to further expand the knowledge of relevant theory
and practice in the conflict resolution field.
2) Arts-based activities can be an effective tool to help improve the relational
component of identity conflicts.
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3) Conflicts can often be highly irrational and their consequences, thus processes that
work with the non-rational aspects of people are an important component of
peacebuilding.
Given the very limited literature and research on the intersection of arts and
peacebuilding in general and specific to Bosnia-Herzegovina I choose to conduct a single
exploratory case study based on qualitative methods of data collection (Robson, 1993). The
research is based on an inductive grounded theory approach to data analysis and theory building,
using qualitative methods of analysis (Brause, 2000; Straus & Corbin, 1990).
The primary source of data for the research is based on primary interviews with 64
individuals working with arts and peacebuilding in the field. Gathering evaluation reports,
project proposals, and other forms of documentation concerning arts-based conflict resolution
projects supplemented the interviews. Additional data was gathered through a systematic review
of two weekly magazines and a daily newspaper, for relevant articles on peacebuilding and arts.
A fourth area of data method consisted of informal participant observation of a small number of
activities.
The interviews have been transcribed in their entirety and coding and analysis was
conducted using an inductive approach in which the codes and categories emerge from the data
under study (Brause, 2000). The other sources of data are being used as supplementary material
and select portions are being translated and analyzed. In order to do more rapid and effective
coding, the qualitative analysis program Atlas.ti was used to assist in coding and pattern
searching.
Findings
The findings to date can be divided into two main areas; the first is the role of arts based
processes during the war, while the second is arts-based processes and peacebuilding in the postwar phase.
Art and Social Resistance, War-time Sarajevo
During the war in Bosnia, the site of cultural resistance in Bosnia was focused in the
capital of Sarajevo. After the initial shock of the onset and brutality of war, artists from all
ethnic groups who remained in Sarajevo began a series of cultural actions that would continue
throughout the war. A significant number of people in Sarajevo risked their lives by attending
and organizing these events. Many interviewees explained that these activities gave people a
chance to escape the harsh reality, if only for a few hours, and be safe (even if shelling
continued). As Safet Plakalo, the writer of one of the first plays performed during the explains,
As the creators of this play, we were presented with an ethical dilemma that we had to
solve: is it ethically appropriate, and if so, to what degree is it appropriate to do theater in
moments when all around us people are suffering and dying. Of course this dilemma lasted only
a short time. Until we realized that show, as well as the enormous theater production that was
initiated by that show, did an exceptional amount of good for Sarajevans, both as some sort of
therapy, and as an affirmation of our struggle and resistance in Sarajevo (cited in FAMA, 2000,
p.236).
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One of the most famous war-time arts-based activities was the International Theater and
Film Festival in 1993. During the 10 day festival, over 140 movies were with about 20,000
visitors (Sarajevski, 1996). To many in the outside world, the idea of organizing a film festival
in the middle of a war, might appear absurd, given the extreme conditions that the populace of
Sarajevo was facing. But as Haris Pasovic (2001), one of the main organizers of the festival
explained, ″there are many things you can live without, food, etc, but you need film or arts for
the magic. In the war it was particularly powerful to be watching films and be able to be
transported to another world and also release emotions through the film (as many kept them
bottled up during the war).”
There are many other actions that took place in Sarajevo during the war within the
cultural sphere. These range from the famous Witness of Existence series of exhibitions in
which several famous artists created temporary exhibits out of material from the war, to youth
centered creative therapy projects to help young people cope, to Rock Under Siege, a live
concert to celebrate music during the war.
Based on an analysis of the data, several main reasons lie behind the flowering of
cultural life during the siege of Sarajevo. The first is that the war was so barbaric and uncultured
that responding with culture was a way to resist and affirm the multi-ethnic nature of BosniaHerzegovina. Moreover a significant aspect of the war consisted of the destruction of the culture
of the opposing sides, and in Sarajevo many people choose culture as a means of opposing this.
As one of the leading cultural figures in Sarajevo said, “I mean every field,
I mean from theater to visual arts, that was kind of response to kind of, kind of civil
resistance to what happened with them here.” An equally important reason cited by many
interviewees, was the need to do something, instead of sitting idly by and witnessing the
destruction take place. Within the larger concept of peacebuilding and civil society, my findings
indicate that the significant amount of activity in Sarajevo and to some degree in smaller cities,
had more to do with a means of surviving, of resisting the war, of trying to function with some
degree of normalcy within an insane environment, than with a conscious choice of
peacebuilding, although there were also some activities orientated to peacebuilding such as the
weekly prayer for peace at the Kamerni Theater that was held throughout the war.
Given the highly escalated nature of the conflict with severe violence and force
dominating the conflict, it is unlikely that other forms of more direct peacebuilding based in the
arts or other forms of civil society could have taken place; as according to Fisher and Keashley’s
(1991) contingency model the conflict was at the most destructive phase. However, based on
events in Sarajevo, it is clear that arts-based approaches can play an essential role in social
protest, helping the citizens survive and maintain their humanity, and raising the awareness of
the wider world community. Moreover, arts-based activities during the war can be considered
precursors of the peacebuilding and art events that took place in the aftermath of the conflict.
Post-War
With the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the signing of the Dayton accords
in 1995, life returned to some degree of normality. However, the social fabric, political life and
economy were highly divided, along with a great deal of trauma and suffering amongst the
populace. Within the sphere of arts and peacebuilding activities that took place in the post-war
setting, there are several main areas. The first is the proliferation of youth and arts based
programs throughout the country.

Vol. 10, No.2

Peace & Studies Conflict

Zelizer 70

Most of these programs are based at the many local and international sponsored youth
centers located in the country and in most cases the arts would not be classified as a
peacebuilding process and instead more as a creative activity to entertain and help youth.
However, in several instances the focus of these activities is not only on teaching youth a
specific arts process but using the process to bring together youth in highly divided regions. In
these cases, whether it is a drumming circle with youth from divided sides of Mostar or a
theater group with youth from different regions of Bosnia, through arts-based processes the
youth have been able to interact with one another and positively affect their community.
A second significant activity that developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war and
especially in the post-war period is the use of creative arts therapies. The majority of these
activities have focused on young people and children with the primary goal of helping them
cope with traumatic situations and heal emotionally and mentally. Although these programs are
not directly focused on peacebuilding, they have resulted in a positive change for the youth
who participated, with a reduction in levels of trauma, feelings of anxiety and increased ability
of youth to interact socially in society and thus has some relevance for peacebuilding work.
A third type of activity in the post-war situation, are arts-based activities that have a
high component of peacebuilding. Such processes include a multi-ethnic, inter-faith choir based
in Sarajevo, which has performed over 100 concerts within the country and abroad. A second
is a theater and drama in education program that works with teachers and students throughout
Bosnia-Herzegovina to use theater as a tool for peacebuilding. Each of these programs is an
example of the potential of arts-based processes to bring people together and positively impact
the larger community. Many of the interviewees indicated arts based processes are especially
useful because they help create a safe space to bring people together and explore emotions,
ideas and work on cooperative projects. As one member of the choir explained about the
having music as the focus in their work,
In the times that were really difficult and challenging, we had to focus on the
music. So that sort of as our superordinate goal, was perfect. That’s why it works,
that’s why this whole thing functions. If it were just some group of people getting
together to talk about their experiences, it would have folded three years ago. But
the fact that we do have the music to focus on and we all agree on that. What I
think is amazing about the choir is that we learn to sing each other’s songs.
Finally there are also a number of higher profile one time, more elite events, that took
place in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the primary focus was on the particular performance, but
which did have a peacebuilding component. One example is the U2 concert in Sarajevo in 1997,
which brought together over 45,000 people from throughout the region to attend the concert,
including over 1,000 from Republika Srbska (Sacirbegovic, 1997). While the concert was only
for one night, Bono (the lead singer of U2) stated that they made particular effort to get tickets to
people in all different parts of the country and the neighboring states (cited in Sacirbegovic,
1997).
The chart below offers an outline of the types of arts based activities in post-war Bosnia.
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Types of Arts-Based Peacebuilding Activities in Post-War Bosnia
Type of Activity
1. Youth Programs

2. Art and creative
therapy programs

3. Arts for
Peacebuilding
4. Training Tool
within conflict
resolution
5. Short-term
program
6. Elite Arts

Purpose
Throughout Bosnia, many youth
programs and youth houses use the
creative performing arts as part of their
activities. Often these are not so much
peacebuilding activities, more
entertainment for youth, however some
programs are designed more as
peacebuilding processes to bring groups
together.
Several programs were setup at the end
of war to use arts-based and creative
therapies as tools to work with more
traumatized populations, primarily with
refugees and Internally Displaced
Peoples.
Several projects were established in
post-war period. Balance between
product and process of bringing people
together.
Many training programs and
workshops use arts based component as
a tool or component of process.
Bring together people from around the
country to attend arts activity.
In more traditional arts some plays,
music, movies dealt with the war from
various perspectives. Also many
continued to feature actors from diverse
backgrounds, particularly in Sarajevo.

Level of Focus
Individual/Community

Mostly Individual

Individual/Community

Individual/Community.
Community/Society.
Individual/Community/
Society

Conclusions
As with any exploratory research endeavor, the ability to generalize from the research
findings is a difficult task. The goal of this research is to begin to document the connection
between arts and peacebuilding in one particular case, to develop a theoretical framework that
could then be used and tested in other situations. One of the primary challenges that the
researcher experienced in this process is that the intended focus of the research, when arts are
used to specifically intervene and help resolve conflict, was not the dominant form of arts based
processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead the majority of cases under study were more focused
on training processes and fostering improved relations between groups, in which the arts were
used to help develop understanding and products rather than intervene in a particular conflict.
What is clear, in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the arts are a powerful process for bringing
groups together through a creative process, to help rebuild social relationships and at times
engaging the community.
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Several conclusions can be made at this point related to Bosnia-Herzegovina that has
implications for the field in general. First, in conflicts on the verge of violence, the arts can also
help raise awareness of the dangers of impending conflict and speak out in favor of peace. In the
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, arts-based processes assisted people within the country keep their
humanity, and also helped keep the war on the world’s conscience.
Moreover, arts-based peacebuilding processes can play an important role in helping to
foster interaction in divided societies and help facilitate reconciliation.
While the arts may not have been used to intervene in specific community conflicts at
least in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community should further examine and help
support arts-based processes as a process for peacebuilding. In many regions of the world,
international and local NGOs and artists are conducting arts-based peacebuilding processes,
whether it is organizing community theater in war-torn regions of Africa, an inter-ethnic MidEast Symphony, or the grassroots work of Augusto Boal (1985) type of theater in local
communities worldwide. While more research is needed to further refine the concepts explored
in this research, a central argument that needs to be emphasized is in post-conflict reconstruction
efforts that more creative artistic processes need to be included. Through support of such
activities this can assist individuals and groups in healing from the horrors of war and serve as a
bridge to facilitating increased intergroup-interaction and healing.
A third area that needs further examination is the difficultly of drawing generalizable
conclusions from a single case study. The findings from this exploratory case study from Bosnia
need to be compared with other regions of the world where arts-based activities are playing a
role in peacebuilding work, including the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Burundi and
Cyprus among others.
Endnotes
1

This article is based on a paper presented at a panel on “the International Politics of Art: The
Role of Arts in Conflict Management and Post Conflict Peacebuilding at the 44 International
Study Association Conference, Portland, Oregon, February 28, 1993. My field research in
Bosnia-Herzegovina was funded through a National Security Education Program Graduate
Fellowship.
2
Interview # 27. Drama Professor/Community Theater Practitioner. Philadelphia, US.
Interviewed by Craig Zelizer, September 16, 2001.
3
Interview # 41. Cultural Organizer. Interviewed by Craig Zelizer. November 2001.
4
Interview # 17. Founder of Creative Therapy Program for Youth. Interviewed by Graig Zelizer,
Sarajevo, July 17, 2001.
5
Interview # 26. International Member of Choir. Interviewed by Craig Zelizer, Washington, DC,
September 6, 2001.
6
The concept of level of focus of artistic processes was adapted in part from Epscamp (1999).
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EDITOR’S REFLECTIONS: PEACEMAKING AMONG HELPING PARTIES
Honggang Yang
I would like to take this opportunity to initiate a dialogue over some issues of conflict
management among ourselves as third parties or helping professionals. The challenges of
managing interpersonal conflicts or performing internal peacemaking are as real and relevant as
the challenges of our professional undertaking in handling “outside” disputes. While
recognizing there are no ready formulae to address these challenges, I invite you to join in the
open-minded dialogues to examine expectations and premises often assumed among helping
professionals in the fields.
Bowling and Hoffman (2000) have made a keen observation that “as mediators… when
we are feeling at peace with ourselves and the world around us, we are better able to bring peace
into the room.” Since conflicts are complex and ubiquitous, it takes a whole field of conflict
resolution with generations of practitioners and researchers working together to meet the
challenges of the 21st Century. We, as groups of mediators, facilitators, and peacemakers, need
to search for internal harmony and peace among ourselves in order to work well with one another
in tackling daunting human problems and social issues.
There are conflicts and struggles that are constructive and instrumental to introduce
helpful changes, as we know. There is really no exception to this within the conflict resolution
fields where various healthy debates, professional contests, and skill-enhancing competitions do
exist. What has become puzzling is the seemingly widespread difficulty of addressing the
disharmonies and conflicts within the fields, which we as helping parties seem to handle more
effectively outside the fields.
In discussing issues of conflict resolution in organizations of goodwill, Kriesberg (1994)
recognizes that within such organizations conflicts are often not accepted as inevitable.
Members often feel that since they are of such goodwill, they will not “fight” with one another
(Kriesberg, 1994). This situation may lead to conflict avoidance or problem denial in such
goodwill organizations as not-for-profit conflict resolution services, volunteer-based
reconciliation programs, dedicated social justice groups, and devoted peace research
associations. We know well the consequences of avoidance or denial in workplaces and real life
situations.
Second, Kriesberg (1994) notes that members often feel safe in working with people with
whom they share ideals of peace, harmony, and equity. This higher expectation may result in
righteous indignation when colleagues do or say things they regard as hurtful. Third, he
observes that some members feel that they are working so hard and are so devoted to a good
cause, they have little patience for those who are not helping them in their passionate efforts
(Kriesberg, 1994).
Lastly, members of such organizations may often react strongly to any actual or
perceived authoritarian tendencies. In light of their promoting alternative, peaceful, equalitarian
approaches in a larger social context (Kriesberg, 1994), they can hardly accept anything
seemingly arbitrary.
As colleagues working in the field, we have probably been involved in these types of
challenges in one way or another. I realize that our experience as peacemakers may not be so
different from those of other helping professions. Actually we may not differ that much at all
from the rest of society. For example, in a significant number of human service and welfare
agencies, helpers and providers who are supposed to serve and assist the disadvantaged,
sometimes mistreat or alienate them instead.
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The distance between the individuals’ expertise and their respective practicing realities,
including their intentions and consequences, can be vast from time to time. For example, some
medical doctors often have poor health routines or physical exercise records for themselves, or as
the saying goes “attorneys who represent themselves have a fool for a client.”
Smoker (1996) shared with his students some interesting findings from the annual
conferences he attended, where some professors of communications programs made
incommunicative presentations on the communication subjects. In China, it was reported in the
1980s that a large number of model teachers often had “problem” children without realizing the
need (or perhaps without capability) to use their professional skills to communicate with their
own kids at home. Marriage therapists seem to divorce frequently in droves, and business
professors often have bankrupted businesses.
There are influential factors and constraints such as stressful environments in which third
parties often work, divergent commitments, market economy influences, third party’s own
livelihood, and need for enlightened self-reflection. While acknowledging that we as helpers
may also need help, let’s explore creative approaches to addressing the perplexing challenges of
mediating the mediators, facilitating the facilitators, keeping peace among peacemakers, and
solving our own problems in a walking-the-talk fashion.
Since the decade of 1990s, I have heard lots of stories and experienced some fascinating
episodes in person. I would like to share with readers some reflections on the prevalent
phenomena of internal strife in the fields of peacemaking and conflict resolution, to invite more
explorations and dialogs:
Reflection of Fatigue
Conflict resolvers and peacemakers often work in a demanding, stressful environment
such as divorce mediation room, public policy facilitation forum, labor-management bargaining
session, or international negotiation table. We give so much to others—primary parties or
disputants that we may not rejuvenate ourselves or regroup sufficiently. As helping
professionals we definitely need to be able to take care of ourselves, instead of being burned out.
Reflection of Self-Escape
This is another major story! Knowing oneself well is often difficult in general. Yet,
mediators, facilitators, or peacemakers almost have to be self-aware in order to be effective and
proactive in problem solving work. However, some of us as practitioners or researchers came to
the fields, as a way to avoid dealing with our own issues, issues of the same kind that the
profession addresses. It may make us feel better when we are busily helping others with
alleviating the same kind of headaches that we avoid addressing ourselves.
Reflection of Common Sense
Conflict resolvers are special and specialized, but at the same time we are fellow human
beings who are not really different from the rest of the folks in society, in terms of egos, selfinterests, personalities, habits of the heart, emotions, livelihood, face-honoring or face-losing,
and so forth. Our own difficulties bear incredible commonalities and similarities with those in
other walks of life, perhaps with the exception of our deeper, heartfelt frustrations when we
realize we are the very specialists who should be most capable of taking the time applying our
skills to address these problems with our own colleagues.
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Reflection of Market Economy
This is inherently related to the above reflexivity. We need to make a living like anyone
else outside the field. Conflict resolvers and peacemakers happen to operate in the same
competitive market economy environments. In any given practicing arenas or regions, helping
parties may compete with one another over consulting opportunities, training offerings, and other
related businesses.
Reflection of Divergent Commitments
We have many commitments in different arenas of life and career such as the personal,
the professional, the social, the political, the cultural, and the philosophical. These commitments
may be compatible or incompatible within ourselves and/or among ourselves. It is similar to role
conflicts in social life. For those academic organizations and civic groups where we support
their survival and success, resources and means are always limited, which may lead to
competitions.
Reflection of Interdisciplinary Incongruence
Conflict resolution has been evolving on the bases of multidisciplinary inquiries, multiprofessional practices, and multicultural communities. Given this diversity, we should check out
our own assumptions that we think and act alike. Each of us from different backgrounds may not
appreciate the same techniques aiming at achieving the shared ideals of amicable, equitable, and
sustainable solutions to an issue.
Furthermore, while there are patterns or regularities of how to handle conflicts that we try
to summarize, translate, or generalize for the practice and research, we cannot overestimate the
increasing complexities and multidimensionality of human affairs in the contemporary world.
Actually, we can never cross the same river twice, as the Chinese folk saying goes.
These reflections may appear somewhat confusing, illogical, and even paradoxical. In
contrast to other helping professions, for example, dentists may not be able to treat their family
members’ dental problems, while pediatricians may not be able to diagnose their own kids,
though they suffer from the illnesses that they were professionally trained to cure. We are not
really alone in this context. The fields of peacemaking and conflict resolution will continue to
progress, if we can share our stories and learn from other professions and disciplines.
Each of the above reflections is also a research postulate, which I would like to invite our
colleagues and students to explore and investigate. There are certainly other pieces that we have
not touched upon, and other angles that we have not taken. There is so much we do not know
yet. One central theme of this brief examination is around the issues of self-awareness, selfinterest, self-modeling, and self-reflection, instead of putting blame on the outside world (Yang,
1996, 2001). This theme, similar to other topics in the arts and sciences, is culturally defined and
often shaped in special reference to individualism that is a core cultural value in the U.S. In
plain language, individualism looks at the individual as a primary order while everything else is
secondary. The starting point and ending destination are within the individuality itself.
One particular approach to address these challenging issues is of self-reflection. I made a
presentation on this topic in 1996, maintaining that self-reflection is not self-blaming. Selfreflection has an explicit future orientation of how we can do things differently and better next
time from a variety of lenses (Yang, 1996). In certain cultures, e.g. some East Asian societies,
the ability and skills of conducting self-reflections are often perceived as being responsible,
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respectable, constructive, confident, and competent. Self-reflection pinpoints that helping parties
need help and assistance in taking care of ourselves.
In other words, there is no shortcut in taking care of ourselves or internal strife in the
fields. We as practitioners and researchers need to make persistent, conscious, thoughtful efforts
in applying the same level of patience, empathy, sophistication, and technique to the internal
peacemaking processes as we do in our work with others. For example, the International Society
for Traumatic Stress Studies (ISTSS) offered tips in caring for the caretakers after September 11.
While there are no ready formulae or easy solutions, we certainly have a useful box of
tools and instruments that can be adapted and employed to peacemaking among helping parties.
This is a necessary advantage, though insufficient. The sufficient conditions exist in our own
realization and reflection that we are not really immune from or floating above disharmonies or
disputes. One particularly promising but tough approach is through self-modeling, walking the
talk or leading by example. In sum, I have raised more questions than answers, as I sincerely
invite you to join in this journey toward harmony of life and productivity of careers in peace
building and conflict resolution that people are calling the new millennium field.
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